A STUDY ON
STRENGTHENING YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE:

FINDINGS OF SELECTED APRM COUNTRY REVIEW REPORTS
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Preface

This study report has two parts. Part I presents the study’s inception report which provides a background for the readers about the rationale and overall orientation of the report. Part II constitutes the actual output of the study, which is an analysis of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) country review reports and country mission reports of selected countries. The countries covered in Part II of this document are Algeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda.
PART – I

Inception Report

A. Introduction

1. The purpose of this document is to provide detailed conceptual and methodological insights into the study commissioned by the APRM entitled “Strengthening Youth Participation in Democracy and Good Governance: findings of APRM Country Review Reports”. The document also discusses the study’s expanded work plan, the countries selected for the task, a review of the study reports by the APRM and the implementation timeline.

2. The study’s two primary outputs are a consolidated study on the “Strengthening Youth Participation in Democracy and Good Governance: findings of APRM Country Review Reports” and a foundation document for establishing the APRM Youth Development Program. The remainder of Part I has five sections. Section B presents how the study understands youth and young people in Africa. Section C follows with a brief discussion on good governance and democracy followed by section D which presents the analytical tool that the study will adopt, particularly in developing the recommendations to member states and the APRM. The final two sections, E and F, will discuss the study’s methodology and timeline.

B. Understanding African Youth & Young People – a Conceptual Framework

3. There are various ways of conceptualising and defining youth and young people. One of the main reasons for the variations is that young people’s life experiences and opportunities are influenced by a complex interplay of historical, socio-economic, political and cultural processes. The political and economic interests of actors defining young people and the purposes that the definitions intend to serve also play a vital role in the defining youth and young people. Most legal and policy frameworks define youth and young people by focusing on a specific age category. For example, the African Youth Charter adopts the age-based definition of 15 – 35. Almost every African country with a youth policy also adopts an age-based definition.

4. Age-based definitions serve a vital purpose, especially in quantifying and targeting young people through policy interventions. However, both policy and decision-makers need to be cautious about using an age-based definition of young people as the only way of understanding youth. An age-based definition of youth can limit the transformative and inclusive potential of legal and policy frameworks because of the risk of homogenising

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young people. Young people of similar age face different challenges, experiences and opportunities depending on their gender, socio-economic status, geographical location and membership in socio-cultural or religious groups. When young people are homogenised as an age group, such vital but contextual factors that significantly influence young people’s participation in democracy and good governance remain undetected. Hence, it is crucial to understand that youth is equally a socially constructed position within society as well as an age group. The saying “youth are tomorrow’s leaders” has a significant impact on compromising young people’s actual capabilities in the present.

5. One way of complementing the vital contribution of the age-based definition of youth/young people is recognising that young people are navigating through complex processes of transitioning into adulthood. Youth is a discrete age group and a transitional status or phase in life. A young person’s biological age might play a limited role in facilitating or constraining meaningful participation compared to her/his gender, socio-economic status, educational achievements, and dynamics of political and economic relations in a specific country. Alickina Honwana explains this in terms of waithood. Honwana argues that the prolonged period of transition from childhood to adulthood is a twilight period for young people where they strive to achieve economic independence and a meaningful role in society’s decision-making processes. It is imperative to note that there are variations in how young people experience and respond to waithood challenges and opportunities. For example, young women experience waithood differently than young men, especially in the political sphere. Hence, it is vital to be cautious of variations.

6. Young people’s participation in democracy and good governance is also significantly affected by socio-historical processes such as periods of uprisings and political turmoil. Moments of political and socio-economic crisis also create new opportunities and challenges for youth participation. For example, over the past decade, we have witnessed the vital role of information and communications technologies, mainly social media platforms, in shaping the dynamics of youth participation in democracy and good governance. These cases demonstrate that the age of a young person can be only a factor among many other sets of factors either facilitating or constraining her/his participation.

7. Adopting a nuanced understanding of youth beyond an age-based category enables identifying non-formal avenues through which young people participate. Sometimes formal processes and institutions entrusted to promote good governance and democracy might become too intimidating and exclusionary for young people. In such situations, young people tend to show apathy to formal institutions and processes of politics whilst expressing their views and concerns through alternative channels such as art, music, poetry and, as we have witnessed lately, social media platforms.

8. Therefore, a study of young people’s participation in good governance and democracy, and designing new mechanisms to understand their participation need at least two things. First, there has to be a conceptual framework that captures young people’s daily life encounters and experiences both as an age group and people in transition processes.

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Second, a study of participation should also consider the dynamics of political processes that are barely covered through formal political institutions. This includes recognising the role of informal institutions and the role of context-specific historical, political and socio-cultural factors in shaping the dynamics of youth participation in governance and democracy.

C. Good Governance and Democracy in the African Context

9. The emphasis on the connection between democracy, good governance and development became dominant in the policy domain after the Cold War. The World Bank's powerful problematisation of Africa's developmental challenge as a 'crisis of governance' coupled with democratisation processes, further strengthened the argument. The UNDP defined 'democratic governance' in terms of the respect for human rights, participation in decision-making, poverty eradication, responsiveness, equal treatment, inclusiveness, fairness, impartiality, absence of any discriminatory practices and taking into consideration the needs of future generations.6

10. The post-2000 period, in particular, witnessed the mainstreaming of the good governance agenda in several African countries, including considerable efforts from continental and regional institutions. The emergence of both the New Partnership for Africa’s (NEPAD) and APRM is a bold declaration of intent by African leaders to institutionalise the ideas and practices of good governance beyond the realms of policy debates. Furthermore, the mobilisation of various social and political actors such as civil society organisations, political parties, trade unions, and research and academic institutions have also played a vital role in promoting the ideals of the good governance agenda.

11. However, the good governance agenda has also received critical comments for its overreliance on normative and technocratic perspectives of understanding and effecting social change. The nearly exclusive focus on formal institutions, bureaucratic capacity, prescriptions of reform and learnings from "best practices also made the good governance agenda less connected with contextualised political realities on the ground".7 As a result, several scholars advocated revising the good governance agenda to be more versatile in capturing political dynamics outside formal institutions. Prescriptions based on 'best practices' have also been called into question with a growing interest in promoting contextually relevant 'best fit' solutions. The complex web of actors in the sphere of governance at the continental, regional and national level and variations across African countries in the general state of politics, governance and democracy require learning, policy and decision-making orientations not only based on 'best practices' but also 'best fit' solutions.

12. For example, the last two decades (from 2000 – 2020) have witnessed the expansion of efforts to build formal institutions of governance through various initiatives. The initiatives include the formulation of continental instruments such as the African Charter on Democratic Elections and Governance (ACDEG), the establishment of coordinating

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mechanisms such as the African Governance Architecture and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). These efforts to address the challenges of governance and democracy at the continental level have also been directly or indirectly supported by expert studies, several policy recommendations by non-state actors and multilateral institutions such as Afro Barometer, Mo Ibrahim Foundation and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).

13. A general view on the continent’s political landscape over the past two decades also shows both areas of improvements and significant setbacks. Noticeable political improvements include reducing the actual number of civil wars in the continent and the peaceful transition of power between competing political actors (Ghana, Liberia, Senegal, The Gambia, Zambia). At the same time, several countries have experienced political crisis, including election-related violence and crisis (Ivory Coast, Kenya, Zimbabwe), coup d’états (Mali, Guinea, Madagascar) and the amendment of constitutions by incumbents to extend their power (Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda), as well as popular uprisings and mass protests (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Tunisia).

14. One way of capturing the variations mentioned above and deriving relevant policy perspectives is by adopting a versatile theory of change that captures political dynamics and processes beyond the façade of formal institutions. Comparing and analysing the effectiveness and capacity of formal institutions of governance gives only a partial view of the underlying power structure and political dynamics. Likewise, an effort to understand youth participation only within the framework of the good governance agenda’s dominant perspective limits the potential to understand why young people are seemingly apathetic to mainstream politics but front bearers during protests and popular uprisings.

15. The theory of change that this study adopts, particularly in developing the recommendations for Member States to focus on as they embark on the second generation country reviews and ‘recommendations for the APRM to enhance its reporting tools’, is informed by the Complex Systems approach as discussed in section D. However, since every first-generation country review report in the APRM process is shaped by the normative and technocratic approach of the good governance agenda, this study will review youth participation in good governance and democracy as has been reported in the country review reports. This study will meet this research objective with a strict adherence to the APRM’s conceptualisation of good governance and democracy. This will help to ensure consistency both in the framework and orientation of the study. The study will also take into consideration the critical insights on the theoretical and methodological orientations of the good governance agenda in its recommendations both for member states and the APRM.

D. Theory of Change: Complex Systems Approach

16. A Complex Systems (CS) approach enables generating a framework of practices and thinking that recognises the interplay among interconnected elements and their pattern of

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8 https://afrobarometer.org/about
9 https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag
10 https://www.uneca.org/archive/publications/african-governance-report-v
relations. A CS approach seeks to realise change through adaptive and iterative processes that are open to learning and experimentation to realise incremental but system-wide changes. In order to achieve change, a complex system approach challenges the existing set of practices and underlying norms and attitudes.\(^{11}\)

17. In the context of “strengthening youth participation in democracy and good governance”, the study is informed by a framework of practices and thinking about youth participation involving four interconnected nodes of focus. The four analytically distinct nodes of focus are **Actors, Institutions, Resources and Young Citizens**. These nodes of focus are in constant and complex relation and interaction with each other whilst shaping the nature and dynamics of youth participation. Each node of focus is in a two-way interaction with another node of focus. Hence, there is a constant interplay among the four nodes. Any effort to effect change in the dynamics of youth participation needs to centre on at least one of these nodes of focus. Since they are interconnected, the other nodes will undoubtedly respond accordingly. Depending on the context and the reality on the ground, an intervention to enhance youth participation may need to concentrate more on one or two nodes of focus to trigger a response from the others.

18. Understanding the dynamic relationship between the four nodes of focus enables policy or programmatic interventions to be both adaptive and iterative in their approaches. Adaptiveness is vital because youth participation in every country is shaped by unique political, economic and socio-cultural and historical processes. Being iterative is also an equally essential attribute because change rarely follows a unidirectional path. Learning from failures, taking lessons and the imagination to do things differently need to be embedded within every effort to strengthen youth participation in democracy and good governance. The following paragraphs briefly elaborate on each node of focus.

19. The study approaches the state of youth participation in a given country as a political outcome derived from the interplay between actors in their relations to social, economic and political resources mediated by institutions. The study also approaches young people as citizens with rights and responsibilities where both age-specific and transitional features of being young are equally considered. Youth participation occurs in a socio-economic and political context. On the one hand, dominant trends of political and economic processes significantly shape how youth participation occurs. On the other hand, the way young people are actively participating or made to participate also affects the dynamics and direction of political and economic processes within a given state. Examining both sides in the equation of youth participation enables us to understand how the interplay is unfolding in young people’s everyday lives and how the relations either facilitate or hinder youth participation. The complex nature of the various contexts within which youth participation is occurring demands a perspective beyond a one-size-fits-all approach. As a starting point, this study suggests an analytical distinction among the four focus nodes as a good start.

20. **Actors**: actors are individuals, groups of individuals or coalitions with an implicit or explicit socio-economic or political interest in influencing youth participation in democracy and good governance. The varieties of actors include business groups, political parties, socio-
cultural groups, religious groups, armed groups, trade unions, media institutions, local and international civil society organisations, advocacy and lobbying groups. It is natural to have these multiple actors on the ground despite their complementary or conflicting interests.

21. **Institutions**: are “the rules of the game”. Institutions provide stability, predictability and mutual understanding between interacting actors in youth participation. Institutions can be either formal or informal. Formal institutions include codified rules enforced through socially and legally accepted official channels such as laws, regulations, directives and policies. An excellent example concerning youth participation is the voting age or the minimum age at which to claim welfare support from the government. Informal institutions, in contrast, are “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside the officially sanctioned channels”. Informal institutions include common sayings about youth and young people such as “youth are the leaders of tomorrow”, “youth are the hope”; negative connotations about young people as troublemakers and vagrants or widely held beliefs that discriminate against and disempower young women. Formal and informal institutions co-exist and influence each other whilst shaping the context within which actors operate, influencing how youth participation occurs on the ground.

22. **Resources**: include financial and capital inputs that contribute to the socio-economic and psychological well-being of young people and information, ideas, opportunities and social networks realised through relations. Resources are produced and distributed within society. However, access to resources is asymmetrical in many contexts and young people are often disadvantaged. In reality, access to resources is a vital element to realising a fruitful period of youthhood. Constrained access to resources keeps young people in a prolonged period of transitioning into adulthood, i.e., ‘waithood’. Examples of resources that affect young people’s participation in democracy and good governance include job opportunities, education, skills development training, access to finance, capital goods and media, access to decision-making spaces, and influential actors’ influential networks.

23. **Young Citizens**: young people are citizens with rights and responsibilities. Citizenship is one of the most useful ways of capturing young people’s participation in democracy and good governance. Approaching youth participation from a citizenship perspective enables an examination of the relationship between young people and the state. This study will adopt a citizenship focused approach to examine youth participation by identifying rights, the spaces within which rights are claimed and exercised, and the strategies that both young people and the state use.

24. Every APRM member state that the study focuses on has a constitution that codifies civil, political, economic and social rights. Young citizens cherish these rights by participating in invited and created spaces. Invited spaces are platforms established by governments at various levels of governance to enhance youth participation. In contrast, created spaces are venues of participation that emerge organically from young people’s effort to exercise their rights whilst participating in democracy and good governance processes. The mechanisms through which young citizens claim and exercise rights within invited and created spaces can be defined as strategies. Strategies can have at least four features. These are cooperation – when there is an overlapping interest between young people

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and the African state; **co-optation** – when young people trade off their civil and political rights to access economic rights (resources and opportunities); **repression** – when states use high or low-intensity repression methods against young citizens demanding civil and political rights, and **resistance** – when young people refuse to surrender to the repressions of the state.

25. After examining each country review report based on the conceptualisation and understanding of good governance and democracy within APRM’s existing framework, the study will use the following framework to examine the current state of youth participation in each country. Updated data, evidence and country-specific analysis of documents will help to produce the brief for each country.

**Fig.1**: A complex system that shapes youth participation.

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**E. Methodology**

26. The study reviews relevant academic and grey literature\(^\text{13}\) to inform the examination of country review reports and the production of recommendations. The study also uses additional sources of evidence from major data sources such as UN institutions (UNECA, UNDESA), the African Development Bank and civil society organisations (Afro Barometer and Mo Ibrahim Foundation) to generate the country-specific reports. Furthermore, the country-specific reports use infographics (charts and tables) for effective and easy use.

27. The study also considers both continental and global development frameworks whilst analysing youth participation in good governance and democracy and formulating country-specific recommendations. More specifically, the implications of Aspiration 3 and Aspiration 6 of Agenda 2063 serve as a prism through which to review the country reports.

\(^{13}\) Literature that is not made available by commercial publishers. It includes government reports, proceedings, theses
identifying specific recommendations and developing the APRM Youth Development Program. Likewise, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) framework, most importantly Goal 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions in tandem with Goal 4 on Quality Education and Goal 8 on Decent Work and Economic Growth, also inform the review of country reports, the identification of recommendations and the formulation of the continental youth development program.

28. It is imperative to note that this is a preliminary study; hence it does not cover every APRM member state. Hence, rather than statistical representation, the selected countries demonstrate variations across the continent in the state of youth participation in good governance and democracy. Recognising similarities and differences among the selected African states also helps to formulate ‘best fit’ policy recommendations and a versatile continental program. The countries selected are Algeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda.

29. Hence, it can be seen that there is a limitation in this study because of its minimised scope. As a preliminary study, the final report can be used as an input to an extensive scale survey with broader coverage and as a representative sample. The analysis and final report of the study attempt to off-set this limitation by providing a detailed analysis of factors shaping youth participation in good governance and democracy using the proposed theory of change as explained in section D. In this way it is believed that both this study and a future study based on a survey will complement each other to generate a well-synthesised understanding of youth participation in Africa.

30. The selected countries host 44% of Africa’s total population as estimated by the UN Population Prospects of 2019 (588,460 million out of 1.3 billion). The study also covers 24% of the member states of the APRM process. The variation within the selected countries concerning the state of governance is also reflected in the countries’ overall ranking in the 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). The study covers two countries from every tenth rank except for the last tenth rank represented by one country (Chad).

31. The following table presents the selected countries, the year of country review reports and the country’s overall rank in the IIAG.

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14 Aspiration 3 of Agenda 2063 reads as: ‘An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect of human rights, justice and the rule of law’, and Aspiration 6 reads as: ‘An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children’.


17 It is important to note that the IIAG has three key parameters with which to evaluate African governance (score, rank and trend). The overall rank of African governments should be informed by the ‘important trajectories that countries follow’ which is captured by the trend. The country-specific reports will take this vital aspect of the IIAG study into consideration to develop a more comprehensive understanding (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020).
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<td></td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2006 &amp; 2017</td>
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<td>Western Africa</td>
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<td>Central Africa</td>
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<td>Northern Africa</td>
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32. As shown in the above table, except for Kenya and Uganda which conducted their second-round country review report in 2017 and 2018 respectively and Chad in 2016, the remaining reports are between nine to fourteen years old. The country-specific outputs of the study are based on the country review reports and utilise existing qualitative and quantitative data to produce timely policy recommendation both to member states and the APRM.

33. The remaining sections of the report present the analysis of APRM Country Review Reports for Algeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Mozambique, South Africa and Uganda, and reflections on the country assessment report on Senegal and the targeted review of Namibia. Finally, the draft continental youth development programme document is presented.
PART – II

ALGERIA

Analysis of the 2007 APRM Country Review Report (CRR) on Algeria
**A. Introduction**

1. This country analysis seeks to achieve two primary objectives. First, it analyses how youth participation in good governance and democracy is framed and reported in the 2007 Algerian country review report. Second, the analysis applies the conceptual framework defined in this study to examine the country review report and to produce inputs for the continental programme document.

2. This analysis on Algeria has five sections. Section B provides a brief background to Algeria, followed by section C with a thematic review of the Algerian CRR. Section D will use the study’s framework to provide an alternative perspective to understanding youth participation in good governance and democracy in Algeria. Section E focuses explicitly on policy implications, areas of intervention and inputs to the APRM Youth Development Program.

**B. Brief Background on Algeria**

3. Algeria has the fourth-largest economy in Africa in terms of GDP, worth 171 billion USD.\(^\text{18}\) Data from 2011 shows a 5.5% poverty rate, and the rate of unemployment in 2019 is recorded as 12.6%.\(^\text{19}\) The UN human development index, puts Algeria 91\(^\text{st}\) with a 0.748 index value. The political administration in Algeria is structured along 58 districts (Wilayas).

4. With a total population of around 43 million, Algeria has a predominantly urban population of 72%. The demographic structure shows that 61.5% of its population is below the age of 35, and the median age is 28.5 years.

\(^\text{19}\) AfDB (2020). Africa Economic Outlook
6. The 2007 APRM country review report covered youth participation in good governance and democracy by focusing on three interrelated thematic areas. The themes are the legacy of the political crisis in the 1990s, youth unemployment and youth inclusion/exclusion. The following sections will further elaborate these thematic topics.

7. **Legacy of the political crisis in the 1990s:** the CRR recognised that the legacy of the Algerian political crisis in the 1990s as one key factor shaping Algerian youth participation in good governance and democracy. The political crisis, which involved violent extremism and terrorism, left a giant shadow on how young people perceive politics and political participation. The CRR also established a direct link between the political crisis and the other two major themes covered in the report. For example, the CRR argued increased unemployment, especially among the youth, was identified as one of the multiple causes of the political crisis (Par. 1099). The report also noted that poverty, marginalisation and exclusion, especially among urban youth, can "trigger socio-political crisis, in the hidden or in the open" (Par. 1130).

8. **Youth unemployment:** the CRR covered the topic of youth unemployment more broadly. The report covered various initiatives by the government, institutional mechanisms and legal and policy frameworks put in place to address the challenges of youth unemployment. The broader coverage of youth unemployment is also linked with the issues of peace and stability and the ultimate benefits of effectively utilising the young labour force in Algeria's development.

9. The CRR applauded the Algerian government for its commitment to address the youth unemployment challenge using multiple initiatives and coordination across various government bodies. The July 2003 national youth policy, which gave "priority attention" to youth employment issues, demonstrated the government's commitment (Par. 344). Furthermore, the national youth policy is also considered a cardinal document explaining the government's
position concerning youth participation in the wake of the political crisis in the 1990s. The CRR summarised the policy's objective by highlighting the following issues: "participation in national recovery", "participation in the development of civic culture", "restoration of self-confidence among the youth, the state and its institutions", "consolidation of the culture of solidarity, tolerance and peace" and "participation of youth in the design of socio-educational, and cultural activity programs", etc. (Par. 345).

10. The Ministry of Youth and Sports was given the primary coordinating role dealing with youth unemployment, and the government aspired to create synergy among different initiatives that tackle the youth unemployment challenge from multiple perspectives. The different youth unemployment-focused initiatives by the Algerian government included the National Agency for Supporting the Employment of Young People (ANSEJ), the National Unemployment Insurance Fund (CNAC), the National Agency for the Management of Micro-Credit (ANGEM) and the National Agency for the Development of Tourism (ANDT). (Par. 345; 617).

11. There are two crucial cross-cutting issues that helped to address the challenges of unemployment faced by different segments of young people. These are gender and migration. The CRR advocated for a gender-sensitive approach to youth employment intervention. The high number of young unemployed females and the concerted effort by ANSEJ to support young girls who run small businesses is recognised as one of the Algerian government’s best practices on youth unemployment (Par. 1018 and 1019). An equally important factor is the internal migration of young people from the rural areas of central and southern Algeria to the urban and industrialised regions of northern Algeria (Par. 1114) in search of jobs. This required addressing regional imbalances that go beyond just creating job opportunities for young people.

12. The CRR recognised the positive records of the Algerian government in achieving tangible success in dealing with the problem of youth unemployment. The financing of the youth employment-focused programmes contributed to "social peace" by engaging young people in productive activities (Par. 659). The government's comprehensive approach to addressing youth unemployment through multiple socio-economic investment programmes such as welfare housing and employment assistance for youth are considered contributing factors (Par. 870).

13. However, despite the above-mentioned positive records, the CRR expressed two significant reservations about the Algerian government’s efforts to address youth unemployment. The first point is related to the bureaucratic hurdles and red tape that young entrepreneurs face in running their businesses, accessing opportunities and receiving support from the government (Par. 216). The other central reservation relates to the sustainability of the financing. The structural challenges of the Algerian economy to rely heavily on hydrocarbons (gas and petroleum) makes the funding of the youth employment programme vulnerable to trade shocks. Hence, diversifying the Algerian economy is recommended both as a way of creating more opportunities for young people and as a long-term solution to keeping the "social peace" derived from productive young people who have remained removed from the influence of extreme and violent political endeavours.

14. **Youth inclusion & exclusion**: youth inclusion and exclusion is the third thematic focus of the Algerian CRR when on reporting youth participation in good governance and democracy. The exclusion of young people is linked with the "serious [political] crisis" that Algeria has experienced and its impact in creating juvenile delinquency among young people (Par. 348). Youth exclusion is also witnessed in the absence of "youth voices in the budgetary choices
and priorities" of decision-makers and inadequate representation and participation of young people in the spheres of governance (Par. 181; 353; 520).

14. One of the institutional factors that are hindering youth inclusion in decision-making, and thereby sustaining youth exclusion, is hierarchical social relations and the resulting "inter-generation conflict" between the young and the old (Par. 1110). The CRR identified that the power imbalance between the young and the older generation is causing a "suppression of ingenuity of youth" and thereby restricting meaningful participation of young people in good governance and democracy.

D. Alternative Framing of Youth Participation

15. This study adopts the Complex Systems approach to provide an alternative framework to understand the complexities of youth participation in good governance and democracy. Whilst applying this framework in the Algerian context, the framework identifies the intertwined relations among the four nodes of focus, namely Actors, Institutions, Resources and Young Citizens.\(^{20}\)

16. **Actors**: actors shaping Algerian youth participation in good governance and democracy can be broadly categorised into four levels: National, Sub-national (Region/State), Regional and International. Actors operating in these four levels have both a direct and indirect impact on Algerian youth participation in politics.

   I. **National Level**: Actors at the national level that have a direct and indirect impact on youth participation include state and non-state actors. This includes government agencies such as the Ministry of Youth and Sports and non-state actors such as political parties, trade unions, students' unions and youth associations.

   II. **Sub-national Level**: Algeria has 58 provinces (Wilayas). There are variations in these provinces in terms of population, economic activity and natural environment (coastal, hinterland). The fact that the Algerian landmass is massively covered by the Saharan desert and that the primary economic activities focus on the exploration and export of hydrocarbons, contributes to variations amongst these provinces. Likewise, actors that operate in these provinces vary accordingly. In the northern urban and industrialised provinces, we may have more local and foreign business actors that operate in a formally organised system, whereas in the rural and southern part of Algeria we find natural resource exploration companies, loosely organised groups and armed groups. Understanding these variations and their impact on youth participation allows us to give the required focus to specific demands and challenges.

   III. **Regional & Continental Level**: Algeria is a member of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). This AMU has a fairly limited impact in shaping youth participation in Algeria because of its institutional limitations. In contrast, Algeria is a major player at the continental level as one of the big five countries with significant financial contributions to the African Union. Hence, in the absence of an active regional body to influence youth participation, continental initiatives and legal and policy frameworks such as the African Youth Charter play a paramount role.

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\(^{20}\) See Section D of the First Submission (23 Feb. 2021)
IV. Global Level: global level actors that shape Algerian youth participation vary from youth-focused initiatives that target the Mediterranean countries of Africa and Europe, multinational corporations that are involved in the hydrocarbon sectors (oil and gas) and also global mainstream and social media actors that provide information and communication platforms for young people.

17. Institutions: these are both formal (written rules, regulations, laws and policies) and informal (norms, shared beliefs and practices), shaping interaction both among young people and between young people and actors operating at the four levels mentioned above.

I. Formal Institutions: formal institutions that affect Algerian youth participation in good governance and democracy include economic institutions such as labour laws, tax systems, provision of micro-credit opportunities; political institutions such as presidentialism, the legislation and decision-making systems both at the national and provincial level (wilayas); and social institutions that categorise young people based on age, gender, socio-cultural and linguistic identities.

II. Informal Institutions: one of the most crucial informal institutions that affects youth participation in Algeria is the age-based social hierarchy which has created uneasy relations between younger and older generations. Inter-generational economic and political power asymmetry can create political apathy, particularly towards formal political processes, and embolden venues of alternative political engagements that tend to challenge the vitality of formal and mainstream processes of youth participation.

Informal institutions have the power to shape the normative and dominant understanding of society towards young people. For example, in Algeria, some of the dominant and often negative characterisations of young people shape how various actors interact with them. Some of the dominant characterisations portray young people as violent and rioters. The local language labelling includes hittistes (politically apathetic, "wall leaners", idle) and harrags ("those who burn").

18. Resources: these include economic and political opportunities that are either contested by young people or provided by actors operating in the above-mentioned four levels. In the context of Algeria, the hydrocarbon dominated economy makes the rents generated from the sector the most crucial resource in affecting youth participation. As mentioned in the CRR, the socio-economic investment by the government, particularly addressing youth unemployment, has been financed by the revenues generated from this sector. Access to this primary resource varies according to the location of young people (rural/urban, northern/central/southern provinces), the gender, socio-economic status and political affiliation of young people.

19. Young Citizens: the concept of citizenship allows for the framing of young people’s participation in good governance and democracy as rights-based relations with the state and underscore young people’s agency. Young citizens engage in relations with actors primarily at the national and sub-national level to contest or claim their rights. Actual participation in good governance and democracy can also be seen as one way of exercising citizenship. It is important to note that contestations for rights occur in different spaces and they involve various strategies depending on the context.

20. There have been substantive political changes in Algeria since the 2007 CRR by APRM. Significant incidents include the popular uprisings that swept across the Northern Africa region and the subsequent political mobilisation of the masses primarily via alternative forms and platforms of political mobilisation. This report takes the radical change in Algerian politics over the past decade as a primary point of reference to analyse how Algerian youth are exercising and claiming their citizenship rights.

21. The 2019 popular uprising which ousted Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was triggered by his announcement to run for office for the fifth time. However, the underlying factor that caused the massive protest that terminated his tenure was the systemic exclusion and institutionalised gerontocracy within the Algerian elite that marginalised young people from the socio-cultural, political and economic spheres. The 2019 uprising became effective in removing the president from power after the failed popular protest movements during the period commonly called the 'Arab spring' in 2011 and 2014.

22. The 2019 uprising became effective in removing the president from power after the failed popular protest movements during the period commonly called the 'Arab spring' in 2011 and 2014.

22. The effective organisation of Algerian youth to become visible actors in the political scene, primarily through non-formal and alternative venues of mobilisation teaches us at least two lessons. First, understanding the status of youth participation in good governance and democracy needs to recognise the indispensable role of non-formal and alternative venues as viable spaces for exercising citizenship. Political parties, regular elections and formal government institutions may not provide adequate space that fits young people’s interests. Second, in a context where powerful political and economic elites control the formal spaces and institutions of political participation, created spaces become the most viable spaces of mobilisation. In the Algerian case, the inter-generational conflict, the exclusion of young people and hierarchical social relations made young citizens unwelcome actors in formal political processes. As a result, young people pushed for change, as witnessed in 2011, 2014 and 2019, from the spaces where they find more room to influence. A good example is the use of football stadiums as venues for expressing anger, frustration and opposition against government actions by young Algerian football fans. Hence, approaches to the study of youth participation in governance and democracy need a versatile approach to examining multiple venues of exercising citizenship.

23. Examining youth participation through the eyes of young citizens helps to understand youth participation in good governance and democracy by focusing on citizenship rights and identifying the vital role of invited and created spaces in the contestation of citizenship rights. The following table presents selected examples of citizenship spaces for Algerian youth and the corresponding citizenship rights.

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<tr>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Contested Rights</th>
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<tr>
<td>Invited Spaces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria’s National Agency for Youth Emp’t Support (ANSEJ)/National Agency for Support &amp; Promotion of Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Social and economic rights</td>
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22 Ibid, pp. 300
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<tr>
<th>National Liberation Front Party</th>
<th>Co-optation</th>
<th>Economic rights/civil &amp; political rights</th>
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<tr>
<td>National Rally for Democracy</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Created Spaces</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Action Rally (RAJ)</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Youth Movement for Change</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barakat ('Enough')</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
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</table>

**E. Policy Implications & Potential Areas of Intervention**

24. The Algerian case demonstrates that youth participation in good governance and democracy can be specifically analysed by emphasising the vital role of employment in the lives of young people. When governments invest strategically in areas that support the economic well-being and livelihood of young citizens, there is a good chance of realising 'social peace' and positive records.

25. To understand the dynamics of youth participation requires paying attention to the role of both formal and informal institutions. In Algeria, the formal institutions are controlled by the older generation, and young people are excluded from decision-making and influencing policies. However, the sustained mobilisation of young people outside formal institutions and actors such as elections and political parties, and the use of social media platforms eventually contributed to achieving a significant political change in Algeria. Hence, to understand youth participation in good governance requires going beyond normative frameworks to examine power relations between generations and to consider the vital role of created spaces of citizenship that often exist outside the jurisdiction of formal institutions.
Analysis of the 2016 APRM Country Review Report on Chad
A. Introduction

1. This analysis has two primary objectives. First, it analyses how youth participation in good governance and democracy is framed and reported in the 2016 APRM country review report on Chad. Second, the report applies the conceptual framework defined in this to examine the country review report and generate inputs for the continental youth development programme by the APRM.

2. This analysis on Chad has five sections. Section B provides a brief background to Chad, followed by section C with a thematic review of the Chadian CRR. Section D will use the study’s framework to provide an alternative framework to understanding the issues of youth participation in good governance and democracy in Chad. Section E focuses explicitly on policy implications, areas of intervention and inputs for the APRM Youth Development Program.

B. Brief Background on Chad

3. In terms of GDP, Chad is the third poorest country in the world after Niger and the Central African Republic. It has a GDP of 11.3 billion USD\(^{24}\) and a human development index of 0.398.\(^{25}\) A 60% youth unemployment rate was reported in 2017 because of an economic recession caused by the fall in oil prices.\(^{26}\) Chad’s economy is heavily dependent on oil. For example, in 2019, 73% of the export revenue was generated by oil, accounting for 37% of the national budget. Chad is also endowed with massive arable land and livestock. However, 75-80% of the population engaged in agriculture contributes only 35% to the GDP.\(^{27}\)

4. Chad is also one of the countries with the youngest population, with 81% of its population below the age of 35. The median age is 16.6 years. From a total of 16.8 million people, 23% live in urban areas.

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\(^{24}\) [https://data.worldbank.org/country/TD](https://data.worldbank.org/country/TD)

\(^{25}\) UNDP (2020). The 2020 Human Development Index Report

\(^{26}\) AfDB (2020). African Economic Outlook

\(^{27}\) AfDB (2020). African Economic Outlook
C. Analysis of the Chadian Country Review Report with a Focus on Youth Participation in Good Governance and Democracy

5. The 2016 country review report on Chad and its focus on youth participation in good governance and democracy can be examined through three interrelated broad themes. These are the structural bottlenecks of the Chadian economy, the limited state capacity, and high levels of unemployment and vulnerability among youth. These three thematic topics cover every aspect of the socio-economic and political lives of young people in Chad and their participation in good governance and democracy.

6. **Structural bottlenecks of the Chadian economy**: The structural limitations of the Chadian economy emanate from the heavy reliance on the export of oil and the dearth of diversification in the national economy. Erratic economic growth that comes from high oil prices in the international market drives foreign direct investment, which is mainly capital intensive. As a result, any form of positive economic growth will become essentially jobless and negligible in terms of addressing the core economic problem of Chad (Par. 331; 645).

7. The CRR underscored that the current Chadian economic structure and production systems are unsustainable and incapable of addressing issues such as massive youth unemployment and poverty levels. The CRR reported that the level of extreme poverty is 46.7%, and both graduates and non-graduates are unable to find job opportunities to sustain their life (Par. 645).

8. **Limited capacity of the state**: The Chadian constitution grants young people the rights to access education and job opportunities (Par. 162). However, the lived experiences of the majority of young people in Chad shows the exact opposite. For example, existing policy and legal frameworks have failed to facilitate meaningful youth participation, to protect young girls from forced marriage and young boys from forced labour as child herders or workers in various pockets of the informal economy (Par. 172). Government agencies established to address youth issues in general and youth unemployment in particular, such as the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises, the Ministry of Microcredit, and the
National Youth Fund Support (FONAJ), have inadequate financing and constrained capacity (Par. 494).

9. Efforts establishing youth entrepreneurship training programmes and funding mechanisms for self-employed young entrepreneurs have shown good results. However, the broader structural imbalance of the Chadian economy, the skills mismatch, the low diversification of the economy, inadequate access to primary education and the high costs of higher education have contributed to a systematic failure (Par. 153; 171; 664).

10. **Unemployment and vulnerability among youth:** the structural problems of the Chadian economy and the constrained capacity of the state has had two clear manifestations on young people: high levels of unemployment and vulnerability. The high levels of unemployment are caused by a combination of factors such as weak growth, insufficient investment in the non-oil sector, skills mismatch and a lack of political stability (Par. 643). The discovery of oil shifted most foreign direct investment into capital intensive sectors at the expense of labour-intensive sectors that could create more job opportunities (Par.331).

11. The Chadian government attempted to address youth unemployment through the National Youth Fund Support (FONAJ). There are positive results from the implementation of FONAJ in terms of providing entrepreneurship training to young people, facilitating grants and establishing several micro and small-scale enterprises (pp. 17). However, the level of intervention and the state’s capacity to expand FONAJ hardly match the magnitude of the problem. Furthermore, creating job opportunities without addressing the economy’s structural problems means efforts will always be inadequate.

12. The overall level of poverty in Chad also contributes to the vulnerability of young people. There is a vicious cycle that connects increasing population with a heavy burden on the already meagre social services and low job creation capacity within the economy, thus keeping young people in a complex web of vulnerability (Par. 583). Young people are also exposed to violent and armed conflict. The government’s effort to address the problem of exclusion and vulnerability through legal frameworks has remained ineffective. One of the reasons mentioned is the lack of awareness by young people about the government’s efforts to promote peace and tolerance (Par.168).

**D. Alternative Framing of Youth Participation**

13. This study adopts the Complex Systems approach to provide an alternative framework to understand the complexities of youth participation in good governance and democracy. Whilst applying this framework in the Chadian context, the framework identifies the intertwined relations among the four nodes of focus, namely Actors, Institutions, Resources and Young Citizens.28

14. **Actors:** actors shaping Chadian youth participation in good governance and democracy can be broadly categorised into four levels: National, Sub-national, Regional/Continental and Global. Actors operating in these four levels have both a direct and indirect impact on Chadian youth participation in politics.

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28 See Section D of the Inception Report (Part I of this document).
I. National: at the national level, actors influencing youth participation in Chad can be categorised as state and non-state actors. The state affects youth participation through the different arms of government such as the Ministry of Youth and the National Youth Fund Support and the corresponding policy and legal frameworks. Non-state actors that operate at the national level do also have a crucial role in shaping youth participation. These include opposition parties, trade unions, religious institutions and national level NGOs.

II. Sub-National: Chad has 18 regions. Among these 18 regions, some of the border regions neighbouring Sudan, Nigeria, Mali, and Cameroon have experienced insurgencies and violent conflicts. Boko Haram also operates on the border between Nigeria and Chad. Hence, sub-national level actors that influence youth participation include the lower tiers of government and armed groups that play an active role in armed conflict.

III. Regional and Continental: as a member of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), there is room to influence youth participation through existing policy and legal frameworks at the regional economic community (REC) level. Furthermore, policy and legal frameworks at the African Union level, such as the African Youth Charter, can also provide a framework for shaping the spaces of youth participation in Chad.

IV. Global: Chad has quite a troubling past with civil war and inter-state wars (with Libya and Sudan in the 1980s and 90s), and with present-day insurgencies by violent extremists such as Boko Haram and rebel movements. These violent armed conflicts are influenced by arms traders operating at the global level and by transnational actors. The former colonial power France also has an extended role in shaping the political and economic dynamics of Chad. With the discovery of oil and the involvement of the World Bank, multinational oil-production companies and the likes of China can further complicate the role of global actors. In a context where there is considerable institutional limitation to the capacity of the Chadian state, the involvement of these global actors competing to access resources will undoubtedly hinder the potential of developing a robust policy and legal framework that enhance meaningful youth participation.

15. Institutions: these are formal (written rules, regulations, laws and policies) and informal (norms, shared beliefs and practices), shaping interaction both among young people and between young people and actors operating at the four levels mentioned above.

I. Formal institutions: formal institutions that shape the rules of the game in the context of youth participation can be disaggregated in terms of economic institutions such as labour laws and property laws; political institutions such as presidentialism, the three arms of government as well as electoral systems and social institutions such as gender, age-based hierarchies, class and education. Examples in the Chad context include the limitations of the Chadian state reported in the CRR (Par. 172(f)) in relation to the massive gap between the rules and the reality on the ground concerning the protection of young women from forced marriage and young boys from forced labour.
II. **Informal Institutions**: informal institutions include unwritten rules and norms that have a significant influence on social relations in general and youth participation in particular. For example, the level of acceptance at the societal level for early marriage and forced labour puts young women and men in a vulnerable position. One of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of applying legal frameworks that protect young women and men is because changing informal institutions is equally important in effecting change. The problem of youth vulnerability will remain a challenge unless there is a synergy between formal and informal institutions.

16. **Resources**: access to material and immaterial resources affects youth participation. Resources can be socio-economic opportunities or political connections that facilitate the flow of ideas and interactions with actors at various levels. The contestation for the access, control and distribution of resources can involve political competitions among the actors mentioned above. Competition among actors can also shape how young people participate in governance and democratic systems. When young people do not have access to economic resources or remain excluded from the fortunes extracted from their locations, their level of marginalisation can be a legitimate reason to establish or join political groups, including rebel groups. In the case of Chad, efforts are made to distribute the revenue generated from oil into the economy. However, the magnitude of the socio-economic and political problem is enormous and complex, and may need longer to be addressed adequately. In the meantime, resources associated with oil will continue to be source of problems and challenges for young people in Chad.

17. **Young Citizens**: studying youth participation by approaching young people as citizens with rights and obligations gives an enabling perspective to examine how they claim and exercise their rights, the spaces within which they can exercise these rights and their strategies to do so. The normative understanding of good governance is quite limiting to the study youth participation in the context of Chad. The level of poverty, vulnerability and marginalisation among young Chadians and the considerable ineffectiveness of the Chadian state can be alternatively examined by looking into the alternative citizenship practices of young people.

18. Organised and unorganised protest activities are likely to emerge in a context where the state does not meet its expected responsibilities in terms of service delivery and in creating a conducive socio-economic and political environment in which citizens can actively engage and thrive within their communities. For example, in 2016, after the late Chadian president Idriss Déby won the election, protesting young citizens and university students went to the streets to denounce the regime’s inability to provide essential services. The government claimed that low oil prices in the international market had caused bankruptcy, but the protestors were angry about the lavish investment by government officials into their circles and lifestyles.

19. Young Chadians who refused to remain silent organised themselves through the narrowly-available internet-based social media platforms and SMS technologies to organise protest

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30 [https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/05/deby-chad-election-kebzabo/](https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/05/deby-chad-election-kebzabo/)
activities. The failure to deliver protection, social services and opportunities caused a deficiency in legitimacy by the government of Chad in the eyes of its active young citizens. In this kind of situation, formal institutions can provide very little space for young citizens to participate in the processes of good governance and democracy. Instead, young citizens will opt for created spaces, however loosely organised, to claim and exercise their citizenship.

20. The following selected cases are examples of spaces of citizenship for young citizens in Chad, the kinds of strategies adopted in their relationship with the state and the citizenship rights exercised.

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<tr>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Contested Rights</th>
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<td><strong>Invited Spaces</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Youth Fund Support (FONAJ)</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Social and economic rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patriotic Salvation Movement</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
<td>Economic rights/civil &amp; political rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rally for Democracy &amp; Progress</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Created Spaces</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;That's Enough&quot; (Ça suffit); &quot;Enough is Enough&quot; (Trop, c'est trop); Iyina, Tournons la Page and le Movement l'Eveil Citoyen (MECI)</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil, political and economic rights</td>
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**E. Policy Implications & Potential Areas of Intervention**

21. At least two policy-relevant points can be drawn from the case of Chad. The first point is understanding the salient role of state capacity in realising meaningful youth participation in good governance and democracy. Meaningful youth participation does not occur in a vacuum. It requires an enabling socio-economic and political institutional setup. In a context in which the state is heavily constrained in its ability to deliver essential services to its citizens and in which external actors have more room to influence the flow of resources, meaningful youth participation will remain elusive. Strong state capacity with the institutional capability to fulfil the essential responsibilities of protection and service delivery is a sin qua non before setting the agenda of evaluating youth participation in good governance and democracy.

22. The second point relates to the limitations of the normative notions of good governance. The extra emphasis on formal institutions of governance may not provide adequate room in which to understand youth participation in countries like Chad. Therefore, the best way to capture how young citizens are participating in governance and democratic processes is to examine their activities outside the formal institutions and processes of government. In doing so, we will recognise the role of context in shaping the dynamics of youth participation and the vital role of created spaces in facilitating youth participation in governance and politics.
Analysis of the 2011 APRM Country Review Report on Ethiopia
A. Introduction

1. This country analysis seeks to achieve two primary objectives. First, it analyses how youth participation in good governance and democracy is framed and reported in the 2011 Ethiopian country review report. Second, the analysis applies the conceptual framework defined in this study to examine the country review report and to produce inputs for the continental youth development programme document.

2. This analysis on Ethiopia has five sections. Section B provides a brief background to Ethiopia, followed by section C and D which provide a thematic review of the Ethiopian CRR and an alternative perspective of understanding youth participation in Ethiopia, respectively. Section E focuses explicitly on policy implications.

B. Brief Background on Ethiopia

3. Ethiopia is the sixth largest economy in Africa, with a total GDP of 95.9 billion USD. The latest human development index report puts Ethiopia 173rd (0.485). There are 9 regional states and two federal city administrations.

4. Ethiopia is also the second-most populous country in Africa, with 115 million people, 71.7% below the age of 35 and a median age of 19.5 years. 21% of the population lives in urban areas.

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C. Analysis of the 2011 APRM Country Review Report on Ethiopia with a focus on Youth Participation on Good Governance & Democracy

5. The 2011 Ethiopian country review report overall discussion on youth participation can be summarised in two points. First, the country review mission found youth participation at federal and local governance level “impressive”. Second, there is a firm recommendation from the country review mission that Ethiopia needs to establish a National Youth Service Corps. The following sections will further elaborate on these points before moving to the alternative framing and policy implications.

6. **Impressive youth participation**: the Country Review Mission (CRM) referred to a youth development package that guided the overall orientation and practices of the Ethiopian government on youth issues. It mentioned, however, that it had limited engagement with youth to review and analyse the government’s youth development package. However, the CRM was able to gather from the youth that it engaged with that the youth development package has created a regular forum of participation and engagement at the local and federal level. The level of commitment demonstrated by the prime minister's office on “youth advancement” is well-recognised (Par. 240). The CRM recommended that the implementation of the youth package should remain outside of partisan politics.

7. **National Youth Service Corps**: the most important recommendation from the CRM to the Ethiopian government is on the need to establish a National Youth Service Corps. The CRM emphasised that national youth service programmes can be “a powerful tool for youth development and national integration” (Par. 242).

8. **Youth employment**: the CRR referred to youth employment in the context of boosting economic growth and advising the Ethiopian government to provide support for small-scale and medium enterprises (SMEs), to facilitate micro-financing and provide capacity development support for on-farm activities to enhance productivity.
D. Alternative Framing of Youth Participation

9. This study adopts the Complex Systems approach to provide an alternative framework to understand the complexities of youth participation in good governance and democracy. Whilst applying this framework in the Ethiopian context, the framework identifies the intertwined relations among the four nodes of focus, namely Actors, Institutions, Resources and Young Citizens.33

10. **Actors**: actors that have a direct and indirect role in shaping Ethiopian youth participation in good governance and democracy can be broadly categorised into four levels: National, Sub-national (Regional, State), Regional/Continental and Global.

   I. **National Level**: actors influencing Ethiopia youth participation at the national level can be broadly divided into state and non-state actors. State actors include the government and its line ministries; non-state actors include trade unions, religious institutions and faith-based organisations.

   II. **Sub-national Level**: the Ethiopian state is structured along two federal cities and 10 regional states. Each regional state has its own legislature, judiciary and executive as well as bureaus that resemble the line ministries of the federal government. Due to a number of particular features in terms of geography and socio-economic and cultural characteristics, some regions have actors specific to them that affect youth participation. Region-specific actors include traditional institutions and regional political parties.

   III. **Regional and Continental Level**: Ethiopia is a member of the Inter-African Government Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU). Regional legal and policy instruments and continental documents such as the African Youth Charter can be used to influence the state of youth participation in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa is also the seat of the AU headquarters, the UNECA and UNDO Regional Services. These organisations, their role and influence on continental decision-making processes can also be used to influence policies and legal frameworks in the Ethiopian context.

   IV. **Global Level**: global level actors that can affect youth participation in Ethiopia include multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and the UN and transnational corporations that have gained increased dominance in the Ethiopian political economy over the last three years. Example of these actors include telecom companies, the Gulf states and China.

11. **Institutions**: these are formal (written rules, regulations, laws and policies) and informal (norms, shared beliefs and practices), shaping interaction both among young people and between young people and actors operating at the four levels mentioned above.

   I. **Formal Institutions**: formal institutions can be divided into economic, political and social institutions. Economic institutions include legal frameworks shaping labour and tax laws and property rights. Political institutions are the three branches of government, the electoral system and local and traditional leaders. Social institutions constitute gender, class, ethnocultural and social identities.

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33 See Section D of the First Submission (23 Feb. 2021)
In Ethiopia, formal economic institutions that affect youth participation include, for example, the labour law, which does not include minimum wage legislation. As a result, young people are vulnerable to economic exploitation. Formal political institutions include major political parties organised across ethnolinguistic and cultural identities, making young people prone to ethnicised politics and extreme politics that focus on horizontal inequalities.

II. Informal Institutions: These are primarily based on personal relations that create room for favouritism, patron-client relations and widely shared attitudes that shape relationships between young people and local politicians or other adults.

Informal institutions that affect youth participation include the hierarchical social organisation, especially in the central and highland areas of Ethiopia. The utmost respect for elders and the use of such social norms as an integral part of exercising political power is quite common. Further, inter-generational relations between the “revolutionary generation” and the “restrained generation” of Ethiopia is also seen as a vital aspect of youth participation in Ethiopia.34

12. Resources: resources can be both material and immaterial. Resources can also include finance, technical and administrative assistance, as well as political connections and access to decision-makers. In Ethiopia, since the government dominates the economy, young people’s access to resources is heavily influenced by their relations with the incumbent government. There are cases of co-optation by local government officials when young people are participating in the government-sponsored micro and small-scale enterprise schemes as entrepreneurs and business operators.35

13. Young Citizens: approaching youth participation from a citizenship perspective allows for the examination of citizenship rights, spaces of citizenship and strategies of exercising and claiming rights. Youth participation in Ethiopia, particularly between the period covered by the CRR and the present time, has gone through a remarkable change. At the time that the CRM visited Ethiopia, the now-defunct Ethiopian ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), was in total control of the entire Ethiopian state machinery after “winning” the controversial election in 2010, which gave it 100% control of the national parliament. Spaces of citizenship for young people were dominated by the EPRDF youth league, a youth forum that was established by the ruling party and co-opted regional youth associations. Young people actively exercising their rights outside the controlled spaces of citizenship were persecuted, harassed and repressed by the ruling party on several occasions.

14. Young citizens that tried to exercise their citizenship rights within created spaces include young politicians who represented opposition parties, young bloggers who wrote critical pieces about the government and young journalists and media professionals.

15. The institutionalisation of ethnic-based political mobilisation under EPRDF since 1991 has substantively impacted on the political system of today’s Ethiopia. A significant majority of young people are actively mobilised along ethnic lines, which has contributed to an unprecedented level of ethnic-based tension, violence and conflict. Hence, at present, Ethiopia is experiencing a situation in which young citizens have become both victims and perpetrators of violence and crimes because of the political mobilisation that is dominated by discourses of competing ethnolinguistic political groups.

16. Selected youth initiatives, spaces and strategies

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<tr>
<th>Spaces</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Micro and Small-scale</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
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<td>Addis Ababa Youth Forum</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
<td>Economic rights/civil &amp; political rights</td>
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<td>Addis Ababa EPRDF Youth</td>
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<td><strong>Created Spaces</strong></td>
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<td>Zone Nine Bloggers</td>
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<td>Bale-Raey Youth Association</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
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E. Policy Implications and Intervention Areas

17. The Ethiopian case demonstrates that the state-led developmental model has facilitated the emergence of invited spaces of citizenship aligned with its developmental ambitions. The micro and small-scale enterprise scheme is an excellent example of this. Despite the practices of co-optation, the government, at least up until 2018, tried to institutionalise policy-based relations with the youth.

18. The normative notions of good governance and democracy may become obsolete unless they are contextualised into a country’s socio-historical and political context. In present-day Ethiopia, centuries-old competing narratives of political elites create an existential threat to the Ethiopian state. In this context, the perspective that the mainstream good governance agenda provides is too narrow and relatively technocratic, and may never provide a political solution. Hence, it is vital to be cautious of the assumptions and remedies that the good governance agenda promises and push for more political solutions when such complex historical processes cause political tensions.
KENYA

Analysis of the 2017 APRM Country Review Report on Kenya
A. Introduction

1. This country analysis seeks to achieve two primary objectives. First, it analyses how youth participation in good governance and democracy is framed and reported in the 2017 Kenyan country review report. Second, the analysis applies the conceptual framework defined in this study to examine the country review report and to produce inputs for the continental youth development programme document.

2. This analysis on Kenya has five sections. Section B provides a brief background to Kenya, followed by section C and D which provide a thematic review of the Kenyan CRR and an alternative perspective to understanding youth participation in Kenya, respectively. Section E focuses explicitly on policy implications, areas of intervention and inputs to the APRM Youth Development Program.

B. Brief Background on Kenya

3. Kenya is the seventh-largest African economy in terms of GDP, with a value of 95.5 billion USD in 2020. The country is divided into eight provinces and 47 counties. Despite a positive growth record for more than a decade, Kenya’s economy has not been inclusive enough. Kenya’s economy is experiencing high levels of poverty, income inequality and economic informality. Studies show a 36% poverty level (2015/16) with the bottom income quintile receiving only 4% of the national income and in which four-fifths of Kenyan labour is employed in the informal economy. The 2020 human development index puts Kenya in the medium human development category (143rd) with a value of 0.601.

4. Kenya has a population of 53.7 million, with 27.8% living in urban areas. Like many African countries, Kenya has a young population with 75.6% of its population below the age of 35 and has a median age of 20.1 years.

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40 AfDB (2020). African Economic Outlook
41 UNDP (2020). The 2020 Human Development Index Report
C. Analysis of the 2017 APRM Country Review Report on Kenya with a focus on Youth Participation in Good Governance and Democracy

5. The 2017 APRM country review report on Kenya has three thematic areas through which youth participation in good governance and democracy is analysed. The themes are *youth vulnerability and exclusion*, *youth unemployment and government interventions on youth issues*. The following sections of this report present a brief review and analysis of these themes.

6. **Youth Vulnerability & Exclusion:** the CRR identified several causes of youth vulnerability and exclusion in Kenya. One aspect of youth vulnerability is exposure to radical terrorist groups. The CRR specifically highlighted that unemployed youth are prone to radicalisation and to being recruited into terrorist organisations such as Al-Shabab. There are also contexts in which young people become active actors in intra-and inter-state-level conflicts and violence (Par. 120). In addition to unemployment, other causes and manifestations of vulnerability include substance abuse, partisan politics and poverty. The CRR also mentioned that young people are victims of extra-judicial killings (Par. 120).

7. Young Kenyan Somalis and young Kenyan Muslims also face additional layers of marginalisation and exclusion because of their religion, socio-cultural and ethnic background. Incidents of violent extremism and religious radicalism are used as a pretext to cause unnecessary harm to innocent young people. Harassment, profiling, forcible relocation, expulsion and unlawful detention are some of the horrible experiences that young Kenyan Somalis and young Kenyan Muslims face.

8. **Youth Unemployment:** the CRR underscored that youth employment is prioritised as one of "the long-standing issues of the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR)" process along with issues of constitutional, legal and institutional reforms, land reforms, poverty, inequity and regional development imbalances (Par. 17). The level of focus given to the topic of youth unemployment shows the magnitude of the problem. The CRR
identified that national unemployment is 12.7%, youth unemployment is 25%, and female youth unemployment is 27%. Furthermore, it underscored that 80% of the unemployed segments of the population are between the ages of 15 and 34.

9. **Government Interventions on Youth Issues:** the government of Kenya initiated various policy frameworks that enabled it to address the problem of youth unemployment. These initiatives include the Uwezo Fund (Par. 153), the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (Par. 234), the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), the Constituency Bursary Fund (CBF) and the Women Employment Fund (WEF) (Par. 343). Relevant legal frameworks include the Employment Act (2007) and the Basic Education Act (2013). The Kenyan government addressed the problems of limited funding, training and support facilities for self-employed business owners and entrepreneurs through these policy frameworks. The government also created an enabling environment for youth-led enterprises by reserving 30% of government procurement to be sourced from young entrepreneurs (Par. 233).

10. However, the implementation of these youth unemployment-focused policy frameworks have not been without problems. For example, the implementation of Uwezo Fund, which was meant to serve vulnerable and marginalised people (women, youth and young people with disabilities) is referred to by the CRR as a fund that is exposed to patronage and clientelism (Par. 153). Beneficiaries also reported that a lack of connections and capacity to meet the complex procedures and requirements to access loans made accessing the Youth Enterprise Development Fund challenging (Par. 234). On a similar note, newly established devolved funds to the local government are exposed to corruption and nepotism, and local politicians and influential members of parliament misuse the fund for electoral gain (Par. 343).

**D. Alternative Framing of Youth Participation**

11. This study adopts the Complex Systems approach to provide an alternative framework for understanding the complexities of youth participation in good governance and democracy. Whilst applying this framework in the Kenyan context, the framework identifies the intertwined relations among the four nodes of focus, namely Actors, Institutions, Resources and Young Citizens.42

12. **Actors:** actors that have a direct and indirect role in shaping Kenyan youth participation in good governance and democracy can be broadly categorised into four levels: National, Sub-national (Counties), Regional/Continental and Global.

   I. **National Level:** actors at the national level can be either state or non-state actors. State actors are primarily the government’s line ministries and commissions such as ministerial offices (youth directorate), commissions and agencies. Non-state actors, on the other hand, include trade unions, religious institutions and youth-led or youth-focused CSOs and NGOs operating at the national level

   II. **Sub-National Level:** Kenya has 47 counties, and each county has its own political structure and decision-making processes. Since formal political contestations are primarily decided at the county level, understanding the

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42 See Section D of the First Submission (23 Feb. 2021)
dynamics of youth participation in good governance and democracy on the ground requires capturing the processes within these counties.

III. Regional and Continental Level: Kenya is an active member of the East African Community (EAC) and COMESA at the regional economic community level. The African Union and its organs, institutions, legal and policy frameworks focusing on young people are also equally relevant instruments in advancing the agenda of meaningful youth participation in Kenya.

IV. Global Level: Kenya’s economic structure and the vital role of tourism, as well as the relatively open and market-oriented political economy, make it prone to the influence of multiple global actors. These include financial institutions, telecom and digital technology companies, media institutions, UN organisations and other actors working globally. Nairobi, in particular, serves as a hub and a seat for multiple international organisations and institutions (for example, UNHABITAT, UNEP). Any effort to enhance meaningful youth participation in Kenya can use the physical proximity and the thematic and technical expertise and capacity of these institutions as an input.

13. Institutions: these are formal (written rules, regulations, laws and policies) and informal (norms, shared beliefs and practices), shaping interaction both among young people and between young people and actors operating at the four levels mentioned above.

I. Formal Institutions: formal institutions that affect youth participation on the ground include economic institutions that govern relations around labour, tax, property ownership; political institutions that shape the distribution of power between the three branches of government, the electoral system, the organisation of political actors at county level; and social institutions shape relations between age groups, genders, ethnicultural groups and class.

II. Informal Institutions: These are primarily based on personal relations that create room for favouritism, patron-client relations and widely shared attitudes that shape relationships between young people and local politicians or other adults.

14. Resources: The informal economy is dominant in Kenya, employing nearly 80% of the workforce. The predominance of the informal economy makes informal social, economic and political relations vital aspects of everyday life experiences of young people, including relations with economic and political patrons. Examples include social relations through which the day-to-day aspects of a business is run, political relations between elected or appointed officials and the public, the processes of accessing financial, administrative, material and technical support, either from individuals or organisations.

15. The vital role of informal relations in relation to access to resources might not be restricted to the informal sector. Formal and rule-based environments may still require the vital role of informal relationships to function. For example, access to training and financial resources for young people may not necessarily only be influenced by the stated objective and criterion of a government policy. Affiliation to political actors or government officials, socio-economic status, gender and ethnolinguistic background may influence whether a young person can access such resources.
16. **Young Citizens**: The citizenship framework allows us to examine youth participation in terms of citizenship rights, spaces of citizenship and strategies for claiming and exercising citizenship. Kenya has vibrant young citizens who actively exercise their citizenship rights using both mainstream formal institutional processes such as party politics and elections as well as alternative platforms such as social media networks.

17. The 2017 national elections allowed several young Kenyan citizens to exercise their civil and political rights by actively participating in the elections as candidates. For example, eight youth candidates ran for governor positions, 66 young people ran as candidates for senator (seven of them female), 249 (of whom 22 female) ran for membership of the national assembly (parliament) and 3,693 young people (252 female) were candidates for county assembly representatives. Only one young person was elected governor, six were elected as deputy governors, five young males were elected as senators, 23 young people were elected to the national assembly and 303 to the county assemblies.

18. The active participation of young Kenyan citizens in the 2017 elections shows us that youth apathy towards formal political processes is not standard across the continent. What makes Kenya a particular case is that alternative platforms, particularly social media platforms, to exercise citizenship are equally vibrant. There are multiple examples of young people organising social activities, protest movements, election campaigns and political sensitisation activities using social media platforms and information communication networks such as Whatsapp.

19. The following selected examples demonstrate spaces of citizenship, strategies and the kinds of citizenship rights contested.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Contested Rights</th>
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<td>Invited Spaces</td>
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<td>National Youth Council</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Social and economic rights</td>
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<td>Youth Employment Fund</td>
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<td>Uwezo Fund</td>
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<td>Jubilee Party</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
<td>Economic rights/civil &amp; political rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orange Democratic Movement</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
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43 Youth Agenda (2017): Youth Electoral Participation 2017: Quick Facts
44 ibid
E. Policy Implications and Areas of Intervention

20. The most critical policy lesson from the Kenyan case is the importance of the effective mobilisation of young citizens to play an active role in formal political processes. The 2017 elections demonstrated that regardless of the challenges caused by corruption, gerontocracy and exclusion of young people from mainstream politics, young citizens can break into the sphere of mainstream politics. The success of these Kenyan political mobilisers and activists can teach great lessons to young people in other parts of the continent who have lost faith in mainstream politics and feel alienated.
A. Introduction

1. This country analysis seeks to achieve two primary objectives. First, it analyses how youth participation in good governance and democracy is framed and reported in the 2009 and 2019 country review reports on Mozambique. Second, the analysis applies the conceptual framework defined in this study to examine the country review reports and to produce inputs for the continental programme document.

2. This analysis has five sections. Section B provides a brief background to Mozambique, followed by section C with a thematic review of the 2009 and 2019 CRRs. Section D will use the study’s framework to provide an alternative perspective to understanding youth participation in good governance and democracy in Mozambique. Section E focuses explicitly on policy implications, areas of intervention and inputs to the APRM Youth Development Program.

B. Brief Background on Mozambique

3. As of April 2021, Mozambique has ten provinces and a population of 32 million. The country has a substantial natural resource endowment that can be harnessed for the well-being of its citizens. One of these resources is the recently discovered 180 trillion cubic feet of offshore gas. However, the country is also, sadly, one of the countries with a massive level of poverty and destitution. With a total GDP of 15.2 billion USD, 46.1% of Mozambique’s population lived below the poverty line in 2015, with nearly 80% of the poor living in rural areas deprived of essential social services.

4. The latest human development index puts Mozambique ninth from the bottom (above other African countries such as Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Mali, Burundi, South Sudan, Chad, Central Africa Republique and Niger) with an HDI index of 0.456.

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49 AfDB (2020). African Economic Outlook  
50 https://data.worldbank.org/country/MZ  
52 UNDP (2020). The 2020 Human Development Report
5. Like many other African countries, Mozambique has a young population with 78.8% of its population below the age of 35 and a median age of 17.6 years. It also has a considerable segment of its population, 38%, living in the urban areas.

6. The 2009 and 2019 country review reports on Mozambique provide a comprehensive understanding of youth participation in good governance and democracy and changes over time. This section reviews the two CRRs based on three themes, namely the structural...
challenges of the Mozambique economy, vulnerability and exclusion of young people and youth unemployment. The ten year period between the two reports provides a good comparative framework with which to examine the changes in terms of these thematic issues.

7. **Structural challenges of the Mozambique economy**: the 2009 CRR identified Mozambique’s aid dependence and the increasing power of donors and lenders in shaping political and economic decisions as a critical challenge (Par. 532). Inadequate capacity in development planning and financing made the government of Mozambique a weak player in relation to positively affecting young people’s prospect.

8. The 2019 CRR, on the other hand, emphasised that the government of Mozambique has been actively working towards addressing youth issues, especially youth unemployment. There are new policy frameworks such as an industrial policy, a policy for the development of human capital, a reform of professional education and a funding mechanism for skills training and attraction (Par.639). Youth unemployment-focused training programmes in various sectors such as agriculture and fisheries are also underway targeting young people in the rural areas along with the provision of credit facilities.

9. Whilst this intervention by the Mozambique government is a remarkable success, there was little effort to address the structural imbalance of the economy. As a result, positive changes in terms of addressing unemployment remained temporary and less impactful. For example, the 2019 CRR noted that most of the new jobs created in the Mozambican economy are in low productivity sectors and generate low income, especially in the agriculture sector. Since the effort to enhance the productivity of the agricultural sector, which is the largest employer, has not been prioritised, any growth has remained nominal and unsustainable (Par. 452). Since most of Mozambique’s poor and vulnerable live in rural areas, prioritising the productivity of the agricultural sector could also address the inclusiveness of economic growth.

10. **Vulnerability and exclusion of young people**: the 2009 CRR highlighted the link between youth unemployment, crime and violence. Furthermore, the report also mentioned that young people have difficulties accessing housing and land because of exclusionary laws and practices. For example, young couples in urban areas cannot benefit from the government-sponsored housing scheme (Par.1112). These kinds of practices, in tandem with limited opportunities for meaningful economic opportunities, push both young men and women into precarious conditions.

11. The 2019 CRR further emphasised the problem of the vulnerability and exclusion of young people by strengthening the link between poverty levels, economic and political marginalisation and young people’s active engagement in violence and criminal activities (Par.105). Underlying factors such as poverty, marginalisation and exclusion create a fertile ground for the recruiting strategies and practices of extreme and radical groups involved in large-scale atrocious killings. At the same time, unsettled scores between the two largest political groups, FRELIMO and RENAMO, are creating more room for the involvement of young people in violence.

12. **Youth Unemployment**: one of the core problems mentioned in the 2009 CRR was jobless economic growth. Whilst youth unemployment is caused by structural problems in the
economy, and limited technical and education capacity among young people, youth unemployment is also considered a causal factor in delinquency, drug use and prostitution (Par. 1107 and 1108).

13. The 2009 CRR found efforts to address youth unemployment inadequate since the government’s initiative to support young people was not accessible due to high interest rates and stringent credit conditions (Par. 1109). The lack of any social security system to support unemployed youth also made the lives of young people quite challenging.

14. The 2019 CRR commended the efforts of the government of Mozambique in addressing youth unemployment with its new initiatives such as the Financial Education Programme, the creation of the Job Market Observatory and the implementation of the Project for Improving the Model of Professional Education. These new initiatives helped the government to coordinate different policy initiatives to address the challenges of youth unemployment. However, since the economy’s structural challenges have not been addressed effectively, the solutions these initiatives have provided remain minimal.

D. Alternative Framing of Youth Participation

15. This study adopts the Complex Systems approach to provide an alternative framework for understanding the complexities of youth participation in good governance and democracy. Whilst applying this framework in the context of Mozambique, the framework identifies the intertwined relations among the four nodes of focus, namely Actors, Institutions, Resources and Young Citizens.

16. **Actors**: actors shaping youth participation in good governance and democracy in Mozambique, both directly and indirectly, can be broadly categorised into four levels: National, Sub-national, Regional/Continental and Global.

   I. **National Level**: Actors at the national level that affect youth participation in Mozambique can be broadly divided into state and non-state actors. The state actors include the government, its line ministries and the policy and legal frameworks these government offices implement. The non-state actors are trade unions, national-level youth organisations such as the National Youth Council, faith-based institutions and non-governmental institutions operating at the national level.

   II. **Sub-national Level**: Mozambique has 10 provinces. These provinces have their own particular socio-economic and political structures that affect youth participation. For example, the coastal part of Mozambique can be seen as economically viable for the fishery and tourism industries. However, the frequent cyclone that batters the coast areas of Mozambique can also be seen as a physical structure that needs to be taken into consideration when economic programmes focusing on young people are formulated. Furthermore, the recent appearance of extreme radical groups in the Cabo Delgado region also show that the challenges of youth participation may have a strong sub-national character and cross-border features.

   III. **Regional and Continental Level**: Mozambique is a member of COMESA and SADC. Regional policy and legal frameworks that focus on youth
participation in good governance and democracy can strengthen any
programmatic proposals and initiatives in Mozambique. Continental level
frameworks such as the African Youth Charter are also valuable
instruments.

IV. **Global**: the first CRR was concerned about Mozambique’s overreliance on
donors and external economic actors, worried that the structural imbalance
of the economy may have made it prone to donor interests and priorities.
This directly impacts youth participation in general and in the areas of good
governance and democracy in particular. Especially in a context of
substantial natural resource extraction, the role of global economic and
political actors remains crucial. The violent extremism in the northern part
of Mozambique shows that the role of global actors might not always be for
economic reasons. The allegiance that the extreme groups claim to ISIS
and Al-Shabab shows that violent criminal groups can also have
transboundary influence in shaping youth participation.

17. **Institutions**: these are formal (written rules, regulations, laws and policies) and informal
(norms, shared beliefs and practices), shaping interaction both among young people and
between young people and actors operating at the four levels mentioned above.

I. **Formal Institutions**: formal institutions that shape the rules of the game in the
context of youth participation can be disaggregated in terms of economic
institutions such as labour laws and property laws; political institutions such as
presidentialism, the three arms of government, as well as electoral systems and
social institutions such as gender, age-based hierarchies, class and education. In
the context of Mozambique, these include compulsory national military service, as
mentioned in the 2009 CRR. The legal requirement to complete military service
and the implication it has for young people who have not completed the service
can be seen as an example of how formal institutions affect young people’s
participation.

II. **Informal Institutions**: informal institutions include unwritten rules and norms that
influence social relations in general and youth participation in particular. Within the
context of the national military service, some young people mentioned the problem
of favouritism that some young people get in terms of exemption or mission
assignment. Young people have also mentioned the vital role of *padrinho*
(godfather) and *vermelho* (membership card of the FRELIMO party) to access
resources.53

18. **Resources**: resources can be social and economic opportunities or political connections.
Mozambique’s overreliance on donors affects the socio-economic opportunities that young
people can access. For example, the 2019 CRR mentioned that the government of Japan
supports the new youth employment-focused programmes by the government of
Mozambique. This goes against one of the key recommendations that the 2009 CRR
highlighted to reduce overreliance on donor countries. The lack of political commitment to
finance major youth employment programmes that have significant socio-economic and
political outcomes shows that the allocation of resources has a misplaced logic of
prioritisation. In another example, some young people in Maputo mentioned that political

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connections with the ruling party are vital resources that facilitate access to credit and job opportunities, regardless of formal institutions and budgetary allocations.\textsuperscript{54}

19. **Young Citizens**: approaching the case of young people within the framework of citizenship allows us to examine the contestation of rights, the spaces of contestation and the strategies involved. Similar to many African countries, young Mozambicans feel alienated from the mainstream processes and practices of politics. The dominant role that the older generation plays in mainstream politics and political parties and the presence of corruption, nepotism and favouritism, makes young people apathetic towards formal political processes.\textsuperscript{55}

20. The following table presents selected examples of spaces of citizenship, strategies and rights of citizenship contested.

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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
<td>Economic rights/civil &amp; political rights</td>
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<td>Mozambican Youth Organization (OJM)</td>
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<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
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<td><strong>Created Spaces</strong></td>
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<td>Youth Coalition - Mozambique</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
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<td>Mozambique Youth Parliament</td>
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<td>Civil &amp; political Rights</td>
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\textbf{E. Policy Implications and Areas of Intervention}

21. At least two primary policy-relevant points can be gathered from the analysis of the two CRRs on the government of Mozambique. The first is the primacy of addressing the structural political and economic imbalances of the country, which should be taken as a priority. Envisaging meaningful youth participation in good governance and democracy can hardly ignore a political economy context where the state remains weak and heavily dependent on external aid and donor support.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, pp. 112  
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, pp. 112-113
22. Youth unemployment, which is a central focus of both CRRs, is a symptom of a more significant structural problem. Proposed measures to treat the symptom might not adequately address the core cause of the problem. Hence, a solid and robust reorientation of the national political economy should be put forward as one of the key recommendations in the case of Mozambique.

23. The second policy-relevant point is the importance of recognising the growing apathy among young people towards formal institutions and political processes. Political parties dominated by the older generation and political contestations filled with corruption and nepotism push young people away from formal spheres of politics. Hence, enhancing youth participation should consider where the energy of young people is being invested more passionately and innovatively. These spheres are, nowadays, on social media platforms and loosely organised micro-level movements. Understanding the dynamics of these political processes can contribute to capturing the best contributions that young people can make to inclusive governance and politics.
Reflections on the 2019 APRM’s Namibian Targeted Review on Youth Unemployment
1. The 2019 APRM’s Namibian Targeted Review on Youth Unemployment has rightly identified the core causes of high youth unemployment and proposes solutions that require both systemic and institutional changes within the Namibian political economy. This brief reflection reiterates the strong proposals of the targeted review and specifically focuses on four points that may further strengthen the recommendations of the report.

2. The targeted review calls for an active and direct role of the state to achieve a structural transformation in the Namibian political economy. This is a vital recommendation. The directional thrust of the state in the Namibian economy is essential to transforming an economy that is heavily dependent on the export of unprocessed and low-value mineral resources. The Namibian economy has a huge potential to create backwards and forwards linkages between different sectors of the economy and to enhance economic complexity. One way of enhancing complexity in the economy is to replace the raw minerals exported to the world market with processed and value-added export items.56

3. At the same time, Namibia can also use a model of proactive state-led development aimed at acquiring technological advancement to replace key items in its imported commodities by producing them in domestic industries. For example, raw copper constitutes a significant proportion of Namibia’s export (17.1%) and import (13.9%)57 commodities. The country’s strategy of addressing youth unemployment can be built around addressing such an unsustainable production and consumption system.

56 https://oec.world/en/profile/country/nam
57 https://oec.world/en/profile/country/nam
4. Another major point that the targeted review might have not adequately emphasised is the need to frame youth employment-focused policy processes as part of broader social, economic and public policy frameworks. The recommendations of the targeted review advise the Namibian government to address the youth unemployment problem with education and training programmes, government procurement policies and agro-processing programmes. These policies are vital aspects in addressing the youth unemployment challenge. However, a system-wide approach establishing a synergy with other public and socio-economic policy frameworks will also help to address the unemployment challenge at various levels. Other public and social policy frameworks include social protection policies (such as unemployment support), industrial development, fiscal policy, and tax and labour laws and standards.

5. The targeted review underscored the need to establish a Sovereign Wealth Fund as an effective and sustainable way of managing Namibia’s revenue from natural resources. Undoubtedly, this is a valid policy recommendation. Another equally relevant institutional strengthening that Namibia needs is enhancing its capacity for domestic resource mobilisation. Unless the periods of economic boom that usually coincide with a positive market value for natural resources is accompanied by advancement in the economic and social institutions of society, Namibia will always remain a vulnerable economy; one in which the Sovereign Wealth Fund might not provide a sufficient promise for the next generation. Hence, along with its plan to establish a Sovereign Wealth Fund, Namibia can also invest in advancing the quality and resilience of its economic institutions, particularly by prioritising domestic resource mobilisation. A focused approach towards domestic resource mobilisation will also have a strong positive impact on social, economic and public policies and the long-term objective of achieving structural transformation.
Analysis of the 2009 Nigerian APRM Country Review Report
A. Introduction

1. This country analysis seeks to achieve two primary objectives. First, it analyses how youth participation in good governance and democracy is framed and reported in the 2009 Nigerian country review report. Second, the analysis applies the conceptual framework defined in this study to examine the country review report and to produce input for the general programme document.

2. This analysis on Nigeria has five sections. Section B presents a brief background about Nigeria followed by a thematic review of the Nigerian CRR in section C. Then section D uses the study’s framework to provide an alternative perspective to understanding the issues of youth participation in good governance and democracy in Nigeria. Section E focuses explicitly on policy implications, areas of intervention and inputs to the APRM Youth Development Program.

B. Background on Nigeria

3. Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa in terms of GDP, with 448.1 billion USD. With a federal-state arrangement composed of 36 states, Nigeria is also the most populous country on the continent, with 210 million people. With its economy heavily dependent on the export of crude oil and petroleum-related products (84% of total export in 2019), Nigeria's political economy is exposed to external shocks. The overreliance on oil revenues has severe implications on the diversity of the economy and the availability of economic opportunities in other sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing. The unbalanced economic structure is reflected in Nigerian politics, where the rents generated from oil revenue significantly shape the concentration and distribution of political power.

4. The severe impact of Nigeria’s unbalanced political economy is reflected in the level of poverty, unemployment and low human development index. The African Development Bank reported that the poverty rate of over half of Nigeria’s 36 states is above the national average of 69% and the level of unemployment is 23.1%. The latest UN human

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58 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=NG
59 https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/
60 https://oce.world/en/profile/country/nga
62 AfDB (2020). African Economic Outlook
development index also puts Nigeria in the low human development category with a value of 0.539, 161st out of 189 countries.\(^{63}\)

5. Like many African countries, Nigeria has a young population with a median age of 18.1 years. The total population of young people within the 15-34 age group is around 68 million. If Nigerian young people between 15-34 were a country, they would become the eight most populous country in Africa.

C. Analysis of the Nigerian Country Review Report with a focus on Youth Participation in Good Governance and Democracy

6. APRM’s foundational understanding of the nexus between democracy, good governance, peace and security informs the Nigerian CRR approach to youth participation in democracy and good governance. Broadly speaking, the Nigerian CRR framed and analysed youth participation in good governance and democracy based on three interrelated thematic areas. These are Democratic governance; Crime, conflict and violence and Political and economic marginalisation. The subsequent sections briefly summarise these themes.

7. Democratic Governance: the APRM Country Review Mission report was released a decade after the return of democratic politics in Nigeria in 1999. The Fourth Republic, which started under President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999 – 2007), had its challenges, but also laid the foundations for democratic governance. The conflict in the Niger Delta region, the establishment of Sharia law in 12 northern Nigeria states, endemic corruption and government malpractices were some of the overarching challenges to instilling democratic governance in Nigeria. The Obasanjo administration was praised for implementing substantive reform to political governance and socio-economic policies that laid a fertile ground for democratic governance. The reforms include the passing of robust legal frameworks to fight corruption and money laundering and also the establishment of federal offices that curb the misuse of public funds (Par. 97). Finally, the Obasanjo regime left its signature in Nigerian democracy by facilitating the first civilian transfer of power after its second term in 2007.

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\(^{63}\) UNDP (2020). Human Development Report
8. Whilst recognising the meaningful positive steps and existing challenges, the CRM called for some areas of improvement. First, the CRM recommended that the centralised and top-down approach to governance should be replaced by a decentralised democratic governance that effectively utilises existing governance structures: federal, regional/state and local. Second, the monopolisation of political power by the federal state was seen as inhibiting the potential to diversify the Nigerian economy and redress the problems of overreliance on the export of oil. These two, fundamental political-economic problems – “centralized, dysfunctional, ethno-distributive political economy” (Par. 108), have direct implications on the maturity of Nigeria’s democratic governance. More specifically, as will be demonstrated in the remaining sections, it also inhibits the meaningful participation of youth in good governance and democracy.

9. Crime, Conflict & Violence: the CRR identified crime as one of the challenges that young people in Nigeria face. The CRR highlighted that youth are both perpetrators and victims of various types of criminal activities and linked to the broader socio-economic and political challenges in Nigeria. For example, the CRR identified how disgruntled politicians take advantage of ‘unemployed’ and ‘lawless’ youth to deploy them as ‘crime syndicates’. Election-related violence and conflict perpetrated by ‘idle youth’ and ‘student cult in universities’ are also identified as key elements of large-scale crime and violence involving young people. The CRR has also underscored that young Nigerians are exposed to other forms of criminal activity such as rape and human trafficking (especially of young women and children) for forced labour and sexual exploitation.

10. Concerning violence, the CRR identified politicians’ vital role in mobilising young people to get involved in organised violence. The two most important factors contributing to young people’s role in violent groups are their economic vulnerability caused by poverty and unemployment and the vital role of money in influencing political processes such as elections. The CRR noted that the pervasive nature and magnitude of organised violence led by young people forced both state actors and non-state actors (such as transnational corporations) to rely on protection services from vigilante groups. Such measures further deepened the problem of violence and undermined the vital role of the “formal security service” such as the police.

11. The CRR noted that the magnitude “internal political violence and material poverty” (Par. 373) has also turned children into “young adults” and “potential combatants”. Reflecting on the complexity of socio-economic and political processes that have contributed to such a dire situation, the CRR noted that young children’s issues should not be relegated to the private sphere of family life so that the required policy and legal frameworks and political focus can be mobilised to address the plight of children and young adults.

12. Political & Economic Marginalisation: political and economic marginalisation of youth is the other major theme that the CRR used to analyse youth participation in good governance and democracy. The CRR underscored the that the marginalisation of young people in general, and young women in particular, from the political processes was due to their asymmetrical power relations with key political actors. Concerning women (young women included), their role in the political processes is seen as “an extension of their domestic roles such as serving tea, singing and praying” (Par. 339). Similarly, young men are also used as foot soldiers of politically instigated violence, particularly around elections.
In both cases, the marginal role that both young women and men play make them powerless members of society; “used for elections and thereafter discarded” (Par. 339)

13. The CRR underlined that young people’s economic marginalisation is manifested through massive unemployment. The structural factors resulting in massive youth unemployment are well-captured in the CRR i.e., the government’s narrow focus on the oil industry that severely restricts the potential capacity of the economy to create jobs in other sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing (Par. 910). The mismatch between education and the job market is also mentioned. Solutions to address unemployment are often linked to equipping young Nigerians with employable skills and providing them with entrepreneurship training. The case of the Taraba State – Manpower Reserve Scheme, which provides job-seekers allowance to young people, is considered as an example of addressing young people’s economic marginalisation. The CRR mentioned government initiatives to address youth unemployment through the National Directorate for Employment, the Ministry of Youth Development and the National Youth Council. The 2001 National Youth Development Policy is also mentioned as part of the government’s initiative to address issues of youth unemployment. However, since the structural bottlenecks in the Nigerian political economy are not adequately addressed through these youth-focused policies, the political and economic marginalisation will continue for some time.

D. Alternative Framing of Youth Participation

14. This study adopts the Complex Systems approach to provide an alternative framework for understanding the complexities of youth participation in good governance and democracy. Whilst applying this framework in the Nigerian context, the framework identifies the intertwined relations among the four nodes of focus, namely Actors, Institutions, Resources and Young Citizens.

15. **Actors**: actors shaping Nigerian youth participation in good governance and democracy can be broadly categorised into four levels: National, Sub-national (Region/State), Regional and International. Actors operating in these four levels have both direct and indirect impact on Nigerian youth participation in politics.

   I. **National level**: key actors at the national level influencing youth participation are the federal government and its line ministries such as the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Labour and Employment and specialised federal offices.

   II. **Sub-national level**: sub-national level actors operate either at the state level (based on the administrative boundaries of the 36 states) or at the regional level, such as the northern region or the Federal Capital of Abuja. State or region-specific socio-historical and political-economic processes shape the dynamic interplay of actors at the sub-national level. For example, state-level actors in north-eastern Nigeria such as Boko Haram, or armed groups in the Niger Delta region, have a greater influence on youth participation than the federal government does.

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64 See Section D of the First Submission (23 Feb. 2021)
III. **Regional & Continental:** key regional actors include the ECOWAS and the AU. Both actors set the normative tone for youth participation through their legal and policy frameworks and their specialised organs, institutions and divisions.

IV. **International level:** these actors include multinational corporations that are directly and indirectly involved in the political economy of Nigeria such as global oil corporations, media corporations (both mainstream and social media platforms), international research, advocacy and civil society organisations.

16. **Institutions:** these are formal (written rules, regulations and laws) and informal (norms, shared beliefs and practices) that shape interactions both among young people as well as between young people and actors operating at the four levels mentioned above.

I. **Formal Institutions:** these are laws that set the voting age, the lowest age to run for office, age-based definitions of youth and youth-focused legal and policy frameworks on education, unemployment, social protection schemes etc.

The current Nigerian Youth Policy (2019-2023) revised the age-based definition of youth from 18-35 to 18-29. The policy document explains that most Nigerians will have fulfilled key thresholds of transition into adulthood by the age of 29. For example, less than five% of Nigerians are in school at the age of 29 and about three-quarter of young men and nearly 90% of young women are married at the age of 29. Being an active member of the labour force and establishing a family are some of the critical markers of adulthood in most societies.

II. **Informal Institutions:** these include the shared beliefs and normative characterisations of young people. Examples include the labelling of young people as children, irresponsible and people who constantly require adult supervision.

The notion of respect among most Nigerian communities is not only associated with giving due regard to elders but also to people with economic and political power. Hence, “deference” is an essential aspect of the relations between young people and adults. As highlighted in the CRR, “godfatherism” is a vital component of the relationship between young people and the political and economic elites in Nigeria. The implications of informal institutions such as “godfatherism” in shaping youth political participation need to be adequately captured in policies and programmes.

17. **Resources:** these include economic and political opportunities that are either contested by young people or provided by actors operating in the above-mentioned four levels. The kinds of resources that affect young people’s participation in good governance and democracy vary depending on the time, location and historical context. The socio-economic status and gender of young people also shape their capability to access or claim available resources. For example, in the Niger Delta region, oil is the most important economic resource that dictates young people’s participation in politics, both at the local

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65 Federal Ministry of Youth and Sports Development (2019)
and sub-national level. Organized armed movements in the Niger Delta are predominantly constituted and led by young men. In urban centres and big cities, the internet is a vital resource that shapes young people’s livelihood, their social life and their proactive role in good governance and democracy. In most cases, young people with college education and advanced skills training dominate the virtual sphere and the use of internet based platforms for socio-economic and political purposes.

Additional way of examining the role of resources available through the digital sphere and their implications on youth participation is to consider the burgeoning young professionals in Nigerian cities and their relative autonomy from the oil-dependent economy. Young tech-savvy Nigerian software engineers, program developers and designers, popularly referred to as “tech bros”, generate income outside the mainstream Nigerian economy. This independent economic empowerment can change the relationship between young people and political and economic elites in mainstream politics. The recent #EndSARS protest activities in October 2020 indicate these newly emerging dynamics in youth participation in politics outside the existing formal and informal institutions and the vital role of new avenues of accessing resources.66

18. Young Citizens: the concept of citizenship allows for the framing of young people’s participation in good governance and democracy as rights-based relations with the state and underscore young people’s agency. Young citizens engage in relations with actors primarily at the national and sub-national level to contest or claim their rights. Their actual participation in good governance and democracy can also be seen as one way of exercising citizenship. It is important to note that contestations for rights occur in different spaces and involve various strategies depending on the context.

19. Examining youth participation in good governance and democracy using citizenship allows us to identify and analyse the kinds of rights contested, the spaces in which rights are negotiated and the spaces of interaction between young citizens and state actors.67 For example, the well-established National Youth Services Corps (NYSC), which was established in 1973, is an invited space that facilitates youth participation in governance and democracy. Both young citizens and the Nigerian state cooperate because they have overlapping interests. Young citizens acquire valuable skills and experiences that enable them to be responsible members of Nigerian society. Likewise, the Nigerian state asserts its authority and legitimacy by implementing this legally required NYSC program.

20. Another vital example is YIAGA, Africa’s successful campaign under the theme #NotTooYoungToRun. This youth-led mobilisation succeeded in bringing about a constitutional change in Nigeria to lower the minimum age for running for elected positions. The age at which people can run for the House of Assembly and the House of Representatives has been lowered from 30 to 25, for Senate and Governorship from 35 to 30 and for the office of the President from 40 to 35.68 The campaign also raised awareness of the challenges posed by nomination fees required for potential candidates which marginalise young people with limited financial resources and support from economic elites.

67 See Section D of the Inception Report (Part I of this document)
68 https://qz.com/africa/1292513/nigerias-president-75-is-about-to-reduce-the-minimum-age-for-presidential-aspirants-to-35/
21. The following table gives some selected examples:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Spaces</strong></th>
<th><strong>Strategies</strong></th>
<th><strong>Rights fulfilled/foregone</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Invited Spaces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Youth Services Corps</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Social and economic rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major political parties:</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
<td>Economic rights/civil &amp; political rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP),</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>All Peoples’ Congress (APC)</td>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>Civil rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Created Spaces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YIAGA Africa</td>
<td>Cooperation &amp; Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raising New Voices</td>
<td>Cooperation &amp; Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youthhub Africa</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Social &amp; economic Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Youth SDGs Network</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Social &amp; economic Rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**E. Policy Implications & Potential Areas of Intervention**

22. At least three significant lessons can be learned from the Nigerian case. First, it is imperative to note that political and economic structures such as major sources of national revenue and the sectoral composition of the economy have direct implications on youth participation in good governance and democracy. Sub-national level variations in terms of socio-cultural factors such as religion (north-eastern Nigeria) and natural resource endowment (Niger Delta) also shape the dynamics of youth participation in good governance and democracy. Hence, a one-size-fits-all approach to youth participation can hardly work even at the national level.

23. Disaggregating the dynamics of youth participation using the interplay among actors, institutions, resources and young citizens helps to formulate specific and customised youth-focused programmes. For example, in the Nigerian case, efforts enhance meaningful youth participation need to take into consideration variations at national and sub-national contexts, including the differences among regions. Furthermore, the role of both material (money) and non-material resources (internet) in shaping youth participation dynamics also needs an adequate policy framework.
Analysis and Reflections on the 2017 APRM Country Assessment Report on Senegal
A. Introduction

1. This analysis aims to analyse the 2017 APRM country assessment report on Senegal. The rest of the analysis is divided into four sections. Section B provides a brief background to Senegal. Sections C and D provide an analysis of the APRM report and offer critical reflections on it, highlighting key issues that may need to be included as insights for future country assessment reports and recommendations.

B. Brief Background on Senegal

2. Senegal is best known as one of the few African countries that has not experienced a military coup since gaining independence in 1960. The country is divided into 14 administrative regions. In terms of socio-economic development, Senegal has a GDP of 23.5 billion USD\textsuperscript{69} and ranks 168\textsuperscript{th} out of 189 countries in the human development index with a value of 0.512.\textsuperscript{70}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{senegal_map.png}
\caption{Map of Senegal}
\end{figure}

3. Senegal has a total population of 17.1 million as of April 2021; the median age is 18.5 years. With 49\% of its population living in urban areas, Senegal has a huge young population, with 76.9\% below the age of 35.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{senegal_pyramid.png}
\caption{Population Pyramid of Senegal}
\end{figure}

C. Analysis of the 2017 APRM Country Assessment Report

4. The 2017 APRM country assessment report on Senegal approached the topic of youth participation in good governance and democracy with a particular emphasis on youth unemployment. Three thematic issues dominate the country assessment report and its

\textsuperscript{69} https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=SN
\textsuperscript{70} UNDP (2020). The 2020 Human Development Index Report
analysis of youth unemployment in Senegal. These are the negative consequences of high unemployment, the need for more support for young entrepreneurs and the working conditions of young people. The following sections briefly summarise these themes.

5. **The negative consequences of high unemployment:** the country assessment report emphasises that the level of unemployment in Senegal is unacceptable. The report characterises the status of Senegalese youth as “frustrated, demotivated, faced with poverty, unemployed, gloomy professional prospect and tempted to emigration” (Par. 147). The report also emphasised the potential link between a high level of unemployment with illegal migration and religious radicalism (Par 204; 247 and 254).

6. Whilst emphasising the negative consequences of unemployment, the assessment report identified territorial/geographic disparities and inequalities across the country and within the regions as another critical point of concern (Par. 67). The report recognised that Senegal had done well in addressing social inequalities. However, territorial inequality is on the rise, and the level of marginalisation and vulnerability among young people varies significantly depending on their geographical location.

7. **Entrepreneurial support:** the assessment report identified two national-level programmes on youth entrepreneurship as valuable government initiatives. These are the National Agency for the Promotion of Youth Employment (ANPEJ) and the Program for Senegalese Youth Enterprise (PSEJ). The support for small and medium enterprises with capital acquisition through Guarantee Fund Priority Investment (FUNGIP) and the Sovereign Strategic Investment Fund (FONSIS) is also recognised as a commendable start.

8. Whilst recognising these government initiatives, the assessment report is critical of the overall orientation of the government and of the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ of young Senegalese. The report demands that the government push entrepreneurship as a central policy measure as it drives orientation towards developing a capitalist economy. The report considers the government to be in a state of paradox; building capitalism without entrepreneurs or capitalists (Par. 382). At the same time, the report also demands that young people develop their ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ and have higher aspirations to join the new ‘entrepreneurial class’.

9. **Working conditions of young people:** unlike many other reports, the 2017 country assessment report on Senegal has identified young people’s working conditions as a serious matter of concern. The report linked companies’ weak cash flow and challenging business environment as one of the causes of the pervasiveness of insecure and fixed-term contracts. Insecure job contracts tend to push young people towards self-employment, but their success as self-employed entrepreneurs is not well-documented. Therefore, the problem of insecure working conditions can be seen to have an extended impact on the economy because it can potentially generate more unsuccessful entrepreneurs.

10. The other key area of concern regarding the working conditions of young people is the pervasiveness of the informal sector. The report recognises the informal sector as a “social shock absorber” of the economy (Par.373 and 382). However, the informal economy is also a sphere of gross job insecurity and exploitation of young workers. Hence, the
government needs to take considerable measures towards a gradual ‘formalisation’ of this massive informal sector.

D. Critical Reflections on the 2017 Country Assessment Report on Senegal

11. The overarching focus of the country assessment report on youth unemployment is a valid focus that needs to be commended. However, the high level of unemployment and the negative consequence this has on the lives of young people and their prospects need to be addressed by directly focusing on the underlying problem. A high and persistent level of unemployment is a symptom of another core problem.

12. The youth unemployment crisis is an outcome of structural constraints in the Senegalese economy, which failed to create good and rewarding jobs. Senegal’s export items to the global market are well-diversified; hence the problem of depending on a single or two commodities is avoided. However, the interaction between the various sectors of the economy to produce high-value products domestically is missing. Creating backwards-and-forward linkages and horizontal linkages between the production systems of key commodities can create more complexity and job opportunities for Senegal.

13. Creating such dynamism in Senegal’s economy requires an active role by the state with a robust industrial policy that dictates the economy and creates enabling conditions for local and international actors to operate. Political and economic institutions and incentive structures that encourage the use of Senegal’s natural resources to produce high-end products should be considered as part of a broader strategy to address the problem of massive youth unemployment.

14. It can be observed that the country assessment report has high expectations about the role of entrepreneurship and the ‘entrepreneurial spirit.’ Such approaches toward youth unemployment put extra focus on young people (their motivations, technical and vocational skills, innovativeness and business running acumen) without paying sufficient attention to the structural and institutional factors that perhaps play a more important role in relation to the success or failure of an entrepreneur.

15. Successful young entrepreneurs are not just one training, funding or mentorship away from success. Successful entrepreneurs need an ecosystem of social, economic and public policy that address structural bottlenecks such as infrastructure, energy, markets, technology transfers and funding; and institutional support systems such as labour laws, tax laws and social protection schemes. Therefore, the problem goes further than the lack of ‘entrepreneurial spirit’; instead, it is more the result of limitations in Senegal’s political economy.

16. The country assessment reports a particular focus on the working conditions of young people, and the problems of job security and exploitation makes the report quite progressive in its orientation. Often, the working conditions of young people are ignored and subsumed under the bigger problem of youth unemployment. The country assessment report provided a balanced focus on the dire working conditions of young people, unemployment and the underlying problems of job security and exploitation. The Senegal country assessment report is a good example of how the agenda of addressing young unemployment can be pursued along with creating decent working conditions of African young people.
Analysis of the 2007 South African APRM Country Review Report
A. Introduction

1. This analysis has two primary objectives. First, it analyses how youth participation in good governance and democracy is framed and reported in the 2007 South African country review report. Second, the analysis applies the conceptual framework defined in this study to examine the country review report on South Africa and generate inputs for the continental youth development programme by the APRM.

2. This analysis on South Africa has five sections. Section B provides a brief background to South Africa, followed by section C with a thematic review of the South African CRR. Section D will use the study’s framework to provide an alternative perspective to understanding the issues of youth participation in good governance and democracy in South Africa. Section E focuses explicitly on policy implications, areas of intervention and inputs to the APRM Youth Development Program.

B. Brief Background on South Africa

3. South Africa is the second-largest economy in Africa in terms of GDP, with 351.4 Billion USD. The Republic is divided into nine provinces, each province with its own legislature, Premier and Executive Council. There are also three capitals: the legislative capital (Cape Town), the judicial capital (Bloemfontein) and the administrative capital (Pretoria).

4. With an estimated total population of 59.3 million, South Africa has a high level of poverty of 55.5% and the “highest rate of measured inequality in the world”. According to the latest human development index, South Africa is in the high human development index category with 0.709 points (114th out of 189 countries). South Africa is a relatively urbanised country, with 66.7% of its population living in urban areas. 2019 population data

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72 https://www.gov.za/about-sa/south-africas-provinces#
73 AfDB (2020). African Economic Outlook
75 UNDP (2020). The 2020 Human Development Index Report
shows that 63.9% of the South African population is below the age of 35, with the median age of the total population at 27.6 years.

C. Analysis of the South African Country Review Report with a focus on Youth Participation in Good Governance and Democracy

5. The 2007 South African country review report has three major thematic areas around which youth participation in good governance and democracy is examined. The thematic areas are the continued legacy of the apartheid regime, institutional failure within South African society to positively impact the lives of young people and economic marginalisation of young South Africans. The legacies of apartheid, in particular, set the overarching context within which the other two thematic issues are discussed in the CRR. Likewise, the following sections elaborate on these three themes by underscoring the continued implications of apartheid on youth participation in South Africa.

6. Legacies of Apartheid: the country review report came out 13 years after South Africa elected the first post-apartheid government in April 1994. Hence, the socio-economic and political context that informed the country review report is heavily influenced by both the historical and institutional legacy of the apartheid regime that governed South Africa for decades. The country review report linked the legacy of the apartheid regime with the challenges around youth participation in good governance and democracy by emphasising its implications in shaping institutions, political processes and socio-economic relations. The continued influence of the apartheid regime highlighted in the CRR includes the negative impact on family and family relations with young people, the prevalence of violence and crime, continued marginalisation of disadvantaged social groups and the influence of migration patterns on social relations.

7. The 2007 CRR also noted that the efforts addressing the negative legacies of the apartheid regime were inadequate. The inadequacy of the efforts is seen especially in the lives of
marginalised and disadvantaged groups of society. Concerning young people, the integration of young people from the impoverished background into the school system was lagging. The following thematic points will further demonstrate the manifestations of these inadequacies.

8. **Institutional Failure**: the South African CRR put solid focus on the institutional failure in South African society to protect and nurture young people (Par.921). The problem of the poor socialisation of young people is attributed to the failure to rebuild disintegrated social support institutions at the family and community level. The historical legacy of apartheid which established a pattern of migration-based labour, played a role in weakening the role of the family in the socialisation of young people. Later on, the devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is also recognised as breaking families as the most fundamental source of social support for young people.

9. The CRR reported institutional failure at the family, school, kinship and public institutional level, thus contributing to the widespread violence among children and young people and their involvement in criminal activities (Par. 923). With weak and ineffective institutions, children and young people were exposed to dangerous lifestyles on the streets (Par. 921). By emphasising institutional failure at the societal level, the report identified young people as perpetrators and victims of widespread violence and crime in South Africa.

10. The CRR also established a logical link between families’ exposure to institutional violence during the apartheid period and the continued use of violence to settle political differences (Par. 951). Widespread violence has continued to disrupt the role of families in shaping the lives of young people positively. The use of violence in every sphere of young people’s lives, i.e., in the domestic, social and work environments, shows the magnitude and complexity of the problem and the need for a coordinated effort to address it at every level. The CRR has also recognised the efforts of the government to address the issues of young people through “comprehensive legislative and regulatory frameworks” (Par. 924). To this end, the CRR recognises the efforts of the South African government in coordinating the role of different actors, including non-governmental organisations and faith-based institutions.

11. **Socio-economic Marginalisation**: the CRR has also identified challenges to South African youth participation in democracy and good governance in relation to access to primary education, access to opportunities (such as credit facilities) and unemployment. The problem of access to opportunities is further outlined in terms of a lack of access to information, limited capacity to offer collateral to access credit, poor credit history and cumbersome banking processes (Par. 849).

12. The socio-economic marginalisation of youth is also attributed to the limited institutional capacity of the South African government to provide necessary support. Some of the limitations include decentralisation, service delivery, information dissemination, developmental orientation and coordination among different government programmes and initiatives (Par. 514). Coordinated skills and development programmes for existing entrepreneurs and new entrants are also highlighted as key areas of intervention recommended by the CRR.
13. The third report on the implementation of South Africa’s APRM programme of action under the theme “Broadening Public Participation”, which came out in 2014, provided an extensive update on how the government reacted to the recommendations of the country review mission. The report covered the socio-economic marginalisation of young people and highlighted the various policy level, institutional and programmatic initiatives that the government put in place. For example, the report mentioned the establishment of the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) in 2008 to be a “custodian of youth issues general” and to act as a hub of coordinating the efforts of government, private sector and civil society actors.

14. The various social policy initiatives that sought to address the widespread problem of youth unemployment are also analysed in the third implementation report. These initiatives include are the scaling up of youth-specific programmes such as the National Youth Service scheme (NYS) and the National Rural Youth Service Corps (NRYSC) that seek to improve the employability of young people.

15. Other social policy initiatives that have addressed the issues of youth unemployment include the Extended Public Works Program (EPWP), the Community Works Program (CWP) and the Jobs Fund. These policy frameworks and programmes have been used to address the enormous challenges of youth unemployment. For example, the report mentioned that in the 2011/12 financial year, 50% of the beneficiaries of the EPWP were young people. Similarly, 52% of the beneficiaries of the CWP in 2012/13 were young people.

D. Alternative Framing of Youth Participation

16. This study adopts the Complex Systems approach to provide an alternative framework for understanding the complexities of youth participation in good governance and democracy. Whilst applying this framework in the South African context, the framework identifies the intertwined relations among the four nodes of focus, namely Actors, Institutions, Resources and Young Citizens.76

17. **Actors**: actors shaping South African youth participation in good governance and democracy can be broadly categorised into four levels: National, Sub-national (Provincial), Sub-regional and Continental & Global. Actors operating in these four levels have both direct and indirect impact on South African youth participation in politics.

   I. **National Level**: multiple actors operate at the national level and influence youth participation in good governance and democracy. These actors can be divided into state and non-state actors. State actors include the government of South Africa and various line ministries, offices, commissions and institutions such as the South African Human Rights Commission, the National Youth Development Agency, Ministry of Youth and Sports and UNISA. Non-state actors include political parties such as the ANC and EFF, national-level trade unions, civil society organisations and faith-based organisations.

   II. **Sub-national (Provincial) Level**: identifying sub-national or provincial level actors that affect youth participation allows us to recognise variations

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76 See Section D of the Inception Report.
across provinces in terms of socio-historical factors, economic structures, cultural institutions, geographical locations and resource endowments. For example, economic actors in the coastal provinces of South Africa create different sets of opportunities and challenges for young people compared to economic actors in the hinterland provinces. Socio-cultural institutions of participation, inclusion/exclusion also vary across provinces and depending on the diversity of ethnocultural groups.

III. Sub-regional & Continental: South Africa is a major sub-regional and continental player in Africa, at the SADC and AU level. Likewise, political and socio-economic decisions and policy and legal frameworks also have an essential role to play in shaping South Africa’s internal socio-economic and political decisions and policies. South Africa also host to key continental bodies such as the Pan-African Parliament, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and APRM. Therefore, youth-focused programmes, initiatives and policy directions at the SADC level (for example, the SADC Youth Employment Promotion Policy Framework) and the AU level can be used as vital elements in pushing the agenda of youth participation in good governance and democracy.

IV. Global: South Africa's economy is highly connected to the global economy in producing and consuming both material and immaterial products. Global actors that directly and indirectly shape youth participation include multinational corporations involved at various levels in the mining sector value chains. The amount of rental revenue that South African can generate from this sector and the extent to which this can be effectively used to address issues of youth unemployment will continue to be a vital issue. Furthermore, South Africa is also both a producer and consumer of cultural and entertainment products (sports, film, music, fashion). Both global and South African actors in these industries have a direct and indirect role in influencing youth participation in South Africa.

18. Institutions: these are formal (written rules, regulations, laws and policies) and informal (norms, shared beliefs and practices), shaping interaction both among young people and between young people and actors operating at the four levels mentioned above.

I. Formal Institutions: formal institutions that have a direct and indirect role in influencing youth participation include economic institutions such as land tenure, contract laws, labour laws; political institutions such as the three branches of government and the electoral system; social institutions such as categories of identities (white, black, coloured), education and family. Actors that operate at various levels play a role within a context that is mediated by these formal institutions. For example, political parties compete for power to implement their policies on youth participation through the electoral system and to formulate and implement legal and policy frameworks through the legislature and executive arms of government.

II. Informal Institutions: informal institutions such as chieftainship, patron-client relations, cultural practices that mediate age-based and/or gender relations also have an indispensable impact in shaping youth participation. Since informal institutions are context-specific, understanding their
existence and variations across different provinces or lower levels of administration is essential.

19. **Resources:** resources can be both material and immaterial. Resources also include economic and political opportunities that are either contested by young people or provided by actors operating in the above-mentioned four levels. In the South African context, the most crucial resource that shapes young people’s participation in governance and democracy is land. The legacy of colonialism and apartheid has alienated the majority of black Africans from this significant economic resource. Generally, alienation from vital economic resources goes hand in hand with political marginalisation and exclusion. Therefore, the socio-economic and political marginalisation of South African young people needs to be examined in terms of their relations with this vital economic resource, i.e., land.

20. **Young Citizens:** approaching young people as citizens with rights and obligations allows us to recognise that the youth is not a monolithic group. The different ways in which young people contest and exercise their citizenship, the kinds of spaces within which they claim their citizenship and the strategies they adopt depending on the specific context help us to be conscious of variations among young people.

21. Today’s young South African citizens who came of age in the post-apartheid era have more room to engage with formal democratic institutions and political processes. The regular elections, political parties and platforms of participation at the provincial and local level are remarkable opportunities exercise citizenship compared to the opportunities that young citizens of the apartheid era had. Some young citizens are actively exercising their citizenship rights in this regard. However, it is also equally important to note that formal processes and institutions of governance and democracy do not necessarily fulfil the expectations of young people in their desire to be active citizens.

22. A number of South African young citizens exercise their rights by rejecting the current political processes that they consider to be corrupt and exclusively dominated by the ‘revolutionary generation’ of freedom fighters. The decision by these young citizens who deliberately withdraw from the formal processes of politics and governance can hardly be considered political apathy. Instead, it represents a form of passive resistance and rejection of the current ethos of politics that is disconnected from the everyday life experiences and expectations of young citizens. Young citizens may consider that participating in formal political processes that are corrupt and self-enriching, that misuse public resources and offer poor service delivery to be a legitimisation of those practices.

23. When formal political institutions and practices are rejected, we need to examine the role of alternative and non-formal spaces of citizenship. Young people usually create their own spaces of citizenship to communicate their concerns both among themselves and with the authorities. These created spaces of citizenship may not necessarily target the critical institutions of government or involve a formal organisation and a well-identified leadership structure. Created spaces of citizenship that intend to create platforms from which to exercise and claim citizenship rights might occur through horizontally organised groups, at a gradually increasing momentum, through online platforms and may advocate themes

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78 Ibid: 17
that cross-cut socio-economic, political, cultural and historical issues. An excellent example in this regard is the “Fees Must Fall” and “Rhodes Must Fall” movements by South African university students.79, 80

24. The following table gives selected cases of invited and created spaces of citizenship, the kinds of rights contested and the strategies adopted by young citizens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Contested Rights</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Invited Spaces</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Youth Service</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Social and economic rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scheme (NYS), the National Rural Youth Service Corps (NRYSC), Youth Employment Strategy (YES)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>Cooperation/Co-optation</td>
<td>Economic rights/civil &amp; political rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Created Spaces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodes Must Fall</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fees Must Fall</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Social &amp; economic rights</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

E. Policy Implications & Areas of Intervention

25. The case of South Africa gives us at least two vital inputs for policy and program intervention. The first input is the vital role of historical legacies and their extended impact in shaping youth participation in good governance and democracy. The 2007 CRR report rightly identified the legacy of apartheid and its relations with violent political contestations and social relations, the demise of support institutions and the prevalence of crime. The same historical legacy can also be linked to the staggering levels of inequality in South Africa. Hence, any effort to enhance meaningful youth participation in governance and democracy needs to design policy, legal and program interventions that seek to address the negative manifestations of apartheid’s historical legacy.

26. The second vital input is related to the lessons learned from the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movements by South African university students. Both movements occurred outside the formal institutional frameworks of political participation. Both movements represent new forms of participation by young citizens who may not play an equally proactive role in formal political processes such as party politics and elections.

Whilst maintaining the inclusiveness and responsiveness of formal institutions of politics remains essential, youth participation-focused initiatives should also give adequate attention to alternative forms of political participation. In these kinds of spaces, young citizens pursue their rights in an innovative, authentic and often effective manner.
Analysis of the 2018 APRM Country Review Report on Uganda
A. Introduction

1. This country analysis seeks to achieve two primary objectives. First, it analyses how youth participation in good governance and democracy is framed and reported in the 2018 Ugandan country review report. Second, the analysis applies the conceptual framework defined in this study to examine the country review report and to produce inputs for the continental youth development programme document.

2. This analysis on Uganda has five sections. Section B provides a brief background to Uganda, followed by sections C and D, which provide a thematic review of the Ugandan CRR and an alternative perspective of understanding youth participation in Uganda, respectively. Section E focuses explicitly on policy implications, areas of intervention and inputs to the APRM Youth Development Program.

B. Brief Background on Uganda

3. Uganda has a GDP of 35.1 billion USD and ranks 159th (0.544) in the 2020 Human Development Index Report. The country is divided into four administrative regions and 15 sub-regions. With the prospect of producing gas and oil for the international market, Uganda is expected to have a buoyant economy in the coming years.

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4. Uganda has a population of 47 million (April 2021), of which 25% lives in urban areas. Like many other African countries, Uganda also has a young population, with 80.6% of its population below the age of 35 and a median age of 16.7 years.

![Population Pyramid](Uganda - 2020 Population: 45,741,000)

C. Analysis of the 2018 APRM Country Review Report on Uganda with a focus on Youth Participation in Good Governance and Democracy

5. The 2018 APRM country review report on Uganda has two thematic areas through which youth participation in good governance and democracy are analysed. The themes are youth representation and participation and youth unemployment. In the following sections, the report analyses these themes briefly.

6. **Youth Representation and Participation:** the CRR praised Uganda’s effort to ensure youth representation and participation by constitutionally earmarking five youth representatives to join its national parliament. Youth representation is also ensured across other tiers of government at the local level and in village councils (Par.146). Another way through which the government of Uganda demonstrated its commitment to youth participation is through the launching of the National Youth Policy and the National Youth Council.

7. **Youth Unemployment:** the CRR underscored that the Ugandan government is aware of the magnitude of youth unemployment in Uganda, which is 83.7%. Almost 83% of young graduates cannot find a job because of a skills mismatch and lack of opportunities. Other key contributing factors that the CRR identified include demographic change (increasing population), rural-urban migration, low growth of the private sector, lack of aggregate demand for labour, limited access to financial capital, lack of entrepreneurial and management skills, limited employment opportunities in the public sector because of massive privatisation of State-owned enterprises (SOEs), the prohibitive government wage bill, lack of parental guidance and school success (Par. 560).
8. The Ugandan government recognised the magnitude of the youth unemployment problem and introduced various legal and policy frameworks, including funding mechanisms to support job creation initiatives and entrepreneurs. Policies include the National Employment Policy, the Youth Livelihood Programme and the Skill Uganda Strategic Plan (2012-2022). The funding facilities include the Youth Venture Capital (YVC), the Graduate Venture Fund (GVF) and the Youth Enterprise Venture Fund (YEVF).

9. In addition to these policies and funding mechanisms, the Ugandan government also initiated capacity and skills development training programmes for young people to ensure self-reliance in their entrepreneurial activities (Par. 168). The government also mobilised different line ministries that have a direct or indirect role in addressing the problem of youth unemployment. The government offices involved include the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, the Ministry of Local Government, Private Sector Foundation, and the Ugandan Investment Authority (Par. 554).

10. Efforts of addressing youth unemployment also included revising the education curriculum, putting more emphasis on business, technical and vocational skills and the inclusion of entrepreneurship as a subject. Furthermore, the government provided more funding to science education and teaching facilities. Internships and apprenticeships were also made mandatory to address the skills development gap.

11. Despite all the above efforts, the Ugandan government’s mission to address massive youth unemployment have not been successful. Self-employment and entrepreneurial initiatives by young people fail for several reasons. Studies have shown that the business continuation rate is only 21% (Par.383). Some of the factors accounting for this failure mentioned in the CRR include a weak entrepreneurial ecosystem, a poor skills set, a lack of education and training and poor access to finance (Par. 384). The limitation of the funding mechanisms mentioned above to the urban centres and stringent criteria required to access loans, such as the provision of collateral, are also mentioned as contributing factors to failure (Par. 415).

12. The poor implementation record of the Youth Livelihood Programme and the Skillin g Uganda Programme, the politicisation of the programmes, their link with elections and the intention to use them as a mechanism with which to win votes also contribute to the overall disappointing performance of the programmes (Par. 386; 538 and 559).

D. Alternative Framing of Youth Participation

13. This study adopts the Complex Systems approach to provide an alternative framework for understanding the complexities of youth participation in good governance and democracy. Whilst applying this framework in the Ugandan context, the framework identifies the intertwined relations among the four nodes of focus, namely Actors, Institutions, Resources and Young Citizens.83

83 See Section D of the First Submission (23 Feb. 2021)
14. **Actors**: actors that have a direct and indirect role in shaping Ugandan youth participation in good governance and democracy can be broadly categorised into four levels: National, Sub-national (regions), Regional/Continental and Global.

   **I. National Level**: actors at the national level can be either state or non-state actors. State actors are primarily Ugandan government line ministries and commissions such as ministerial offices, commissions and agencies. Non-state actors, on the other hand, include trade unions, religious institutions and youth-led or youth-focused CSOs and NGOs operating at the national level.

   **II. Sub-National Level**: Uganda has four regions and 15 sub-regions. There are salient variations across regions and sub-regions in terms of political authority, the socio-cultural composition of constituents and the dominant economic and physical structure. For example, the capital city, Kampala, is administered through an authority that has cabinet membership. Some geographical regions, for example, Luwerro Triangle and Northern Uganda and some socio-cultural groups such as Karamajo, Teso and Bunyoro have representation at the State-minister level in the Ugandan government. Variations in terms of political representation indicate that the distribution of power at the sub-national level can have different rationales, and the way it affects young people’s participation also varies according to the context.

   **III. Regional and Continental Level**: Uganda is an active member of the East African Community (EAC) and COMESA at the regional economic community level. The African Union and its organs, institutions, legal and policy frameworks focusing on young people are also equally relevant instruments in advancing the agenda of meaningful youth participation in Uganda.

   **IV. Global Level**: global actors that affect youth participation in Uganda include media institutions, multinational corporations such as telecom and oil companies, international NGOs (FES, Action Aid, EU). These global actors play various roles in shaping youth participation in Uganda, including facilitating activities for young people, providing dialogue platforms and financing.

15. **Institutions**: these are formal (written rules, regulations, laws and policies) and informal (norms, shared beliefs and practices), shaping interaction both among young people and between young people and actors operating at the four levels mentioned above.

   **I. Formal Institutions**: formal institutions that affect youth participation on the ground include economic institutions that govern relations around labour, tax and property ownership; political institutions that shape the distribution of power between the three branches of government, the electoral system and the organisation of political actors at regions level; and social institutions that shape relations among age groups, gender, ethnocultural groups and class.
Two-thirds of Uganda’s working-age population is employed in agriculture and 80% of workers are ‘own account’ workers.\(^{84}\) These economic dynamics imply that economic institutions such as labour and property law are yet to encourage diversity in other sectors such as manufacturing and service. In the political sphere, given the National Resistance Movement’s (NRM) dominance in the Ugandan political economy since 1986, the strength and quality of political institutions remain under the party’s considerable influence. For example, until 2005, Uganda was a one-party state. Even after multiparty elections became institutionalised through a referendum, NRM remains the most dominant actor in Ugandan politics, mainly through its influence over the different arms of the government. The ruling party’s dominance is reflected in its suppression of the media and opposition parties, and its use of the security, intelligence and police forces.\(^{85}\)

The youth are represented in the Parliament of Uganda by 5 youth MPs, with one position reserved for female youth. Given the financial muscle of NRM, these positions are often won by the party’s candidate. Of the two youth representatives in each district and sub-county local council, one should be female. Often, NRM candidates fill the youth positions at these levels as opposition parties lack the structures at lower levels. However, female youth do not play an active role in NRM’s youth-focused structures because their numbers are limited, thus restricting their voice.

II. **Informal Institutions:** These are primarily based on personal relations thus creating room for favouritism, patron-client relations, widely shared attitudes that shape relationships between young people and local politicians or adults.

The vital role of informal institutions in shaping youth participation is manifested in how politics is marred with vote-buying and the central role of patron-client relations in elections.\(^{86}\) The dominance of NRM-allied informal institutions is also visibly demonstrated in these informal relations. The party is a leading political actor that engages in widespread vote-buying by distributing cash through envelopes and offering job opportunities to youth groups as a way of winning elections.\(^{87}\)

16. **Resources:** Financial and non-financial resources affect young people’s participation in good governance and democracy. As mentioned above, NRM actively uses the distribution of money to potential voters to secure votes. Young people who have pretty limited opportunities to improve their well-being through formal employment or the available entrepreneurial activities undoubtedly find the provision of money during election times quite attractive. As discussed earlier, not only the informal distribution of money but also formally established youth employment programmes and the available funds are used as channels to generate votes for the ruling party. Hence, it is essential to thoroughly understand the vital role of resource (financial and non-financial) distribution in shaping the dynamics of youth participation in Uganda.

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\(^{84}\) AfDB(2020). African Economic Outlook, pp. 187


17. **Young Citizens:** the citizenship framework allows us to examine youth participation in terms of citizenship rights, spaces of citizenship and strategies of claiming and exercising citizenship. When exercising their civil and political rights, Ugandan young people organise themselves into youth-led organisations, use resources provided by youth-focused organisations to run their groups and also join youth wings of political parties.

18. The following table presents selected cases of youth initiatives, the strategies and the kinds of citizenship rights contested.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spaces</th>
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<th>Contested Rights</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Invited Spaces</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP), Venture Capital Fund, Graduate Venture Fund</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Social and economic rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Resistance Movement (NRM)</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
<td>Economic rights/civil &amp; political rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), Uganda People’s Party</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Created Spaces</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda Youth Network</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Unity Platform (NUP)</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda National Students’ Association (UNSA)</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Civil &amp; political rights</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**E. Policy Implications and Areas of Intervention**

19. The Ugandan case is an excellent example of how the interplay between informal institutions and the distribution of resources affect youth participation in good governance and democracy. A normative understanding of good governance may not capture these dynamics because the practices seen in Uganda are the antithesis to the standards and principles of good governance. But as we have seen in the case of Uganda, these practices are quite pervasive and provide the incumbent a guaranteed vote. Therefore, policies and programmes for youth participation need to design a mechanism to understand the interplay between informal institutions and the distribution of resources.